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Gaming the System: The Exemption 
of Professional Sports Teams from 
the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Charlotte S. Alexander†* & Nathaniel Grow** 
This article examines a little known exemption to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act relieving seasonal recreational or amusement employers 
from their obligation to pay the minimum wage and overtime. After 
evaluating the existing, confused case law surrounding the exemption, we 
propose a new, simplified framework for applying the provision. We then 
apply this framework to a recent wave of FLSA lawsuits brought by 
cheerleaders, minor league baseball players, and stadium workers against 
professional sports teams. The article concludes by considering the policy 
implications of exempting this class of employers from the FLSA’s wage 
and hour requirements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alexa Brenneman began working as a cheerleader for the National 
Football League’s (“NFL”) Cincinnati Bengals in 2013.1 As a “Ben-
Gal,” she spent more than 300 hours performing at home games, 
attending mandatory practices, posing for and promoting the official 
Ben-Gals calendar, and appearing at required charity events.2 For these 
efforts, she was paid a total of $855, or approximately $2.85 per hour.3 
Ms. Brenneman filed suit against the Bengals in 2014, alleging that the 
team — valued at nearly $1 billion4 — failed to pay her the $7.25 
hourly minimum wage guaranteed by the federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”).5 
Ms. Brenneman is not alone: cheerleaders for the NFL’s Oakland 
Raiders,6 Tampa Bay Buccaneers,7 New York Jets,8 and Buffalo Bills9 
 
 1 Class Action Complaint at 2, Brenneman v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., No. 1:14-
cv-136 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Brenneman Complaint].  
 2 Id. at 2, 6-7. 
 3 Id. at 2.  
 4 NFL Team Valuations, Cincinnati Bengals, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/ 
cincinnati-bengals/ (last visited July 7, 2015) (listing team valuation as of August 2014 
as $990 million). 
 5 Brenneman Complaint, supra note 1, at 13-14; see also Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (setting the hourly federal minimum wage at $7.25).  
 6 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Sanchez v. Nat’l Football League, No. 
RG15756086 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Sanchez Complaint] 
(asserting wage and hour claims under California state law); Class Action Complaint, 
Lacy T. v. Oakland Raiders, No. RG14710815 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2014) (same); 
Class Action Complaint, Caitlin Y. v. Nat’l Football League, No. RG14727746 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. June 4, 2014) [hereinafter Caitlin Y. Complaint] (same). 
 7 See, e.g., Collective Action Complaint, Pierre-Val v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, No. 
8:14-cv-1182-T-33EAJ (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2014) (asserting FLSA claims). 
 8 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Krystal C. v. New York Jets LLC, No. L-
004282-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Krystal C. Complaint] (asserting 
wage and hour claims under New Jersey state law). 
 9 See Complaint, Jaclyn S. v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., No. 804088/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Jaclyn S. Complaint] (asserting wage and hour claims 
under New York state law). Two days after Jaclyn S. filed her lawsuit, the Buffalo Bills 
cheerleading squad suspended its operations indefinitely. See Buffalo Bills Cheerleaders 
Pack Up Pom-Poms After Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/news/buffalo-bills-cheerleaders-pack-up-pom-poms-after-lawsuit/. 
Of the seven cheerleader lawsuits filed to date, Lacy T. and Pierre-Val have settled. 
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Filed for Plaintiff, Lacy T. 
v. Oakland Raiders, No. RG14710815 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2014); Notice of 
Settlement, Pierre-Val v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, No. 8:14-cv-1182-T-33EAJ (M.D. Fla. 
Dec. 24, 2014) (No. 41). At least two cheerleaders have opted out of the settlement in 
the Lacy T. case, however, and are continuing to pursue their claims on an individual 
basis. See Lisa Fernandez, “I’m Not in the Front Anymore”: Raiderette Opts out of Class 
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have also filed suit against their teams alleging that their pay fell below 
the floor set by the FLSA and/or state wage and hour laws.10 Similar 
lawsuits were filed under the FLSA in 2014 and 2015 by former minor 
league baseball players — who sued Major League Baseball (“MLB”) 
and its thirty teams11 — as well as MLB baseball scouts12 and interns 
employed by the National Basketball Association’s (“NBA”) Los 
Angeles Clippers.13 These cases follow previous minimum wage and 
 
Action Wage Labor Settlement with Raiders, NBCBAYAREA.COM (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Raiderette-Opts-Out-of-Class-Action-Wage-
Labor-Settlement-With-Raiders-282936121.html. The remaining cheerleader lawsuits 
are still pending at the time of this writing.  
 10 A segment on the cheerleader lawsuits on HBO’s Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel 
reported that some cheerleaders’ effective wages are as low as $0.05 per hour when all 
of their duties are accounted for. Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel: Bring It On (HBO 
television broadcast June 24, 2014). Some cheerleader lawsuits also allege that the 
plaintiffs were subjected to an array of harassing, degrading, and sexist treatment. For 
example, one of the suits against the Oakland Raiders alleges that the plaintiffs were 
required to change into their uniforms in “crowded public restrooms with little to no 
privacy” and to appear at fan events that “involved inappropriate and/or degrading 
comments and groping from often-inebriated attendees.” Caitlin Y. Complaint, supra 
note 6, at 6-7. The lawsuit against the Buffalo Bills alleges that cheerleaders were 
required to participate in a “Calendar Release Party” while wearing only a bikini 
bathing suit, “with no stage or security provided,” where they were “groped and 
touched inappropriately by audience members during the performance.” Jaclyn S. 
Complaint, supra note 9, at 12-13. The Bills lawsuit further details the team’s onerous 
and intrusive requirements for cheerleader hygiene, including “how to properly wash 
‘intimate areas,’ and how often to change tampons.” Id. at 18. An attorney for one set 
of Oakland Raiders plaintiffs has also noted that the team’s mascot, presumed to be a 
man, earns $40,000 per year, plus benefits. See Robin Abcarian, Cheerleaders Add New 
Defendant to Wage Theft Lawsuits: The NFL, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-second-raiderette-lawsuit-20140606-
column.html. The issues of sex discrimination and exploitation raised by these cases is 
beyond the scope of this article’s focus on FLSA exemptions, but is nevertheless an 
essential element of the “story” behind cheerleaders’ extremely low pay. 
 11 See Complaint at 1, Marti v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-
03289-KAW (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (asserting claims under the FLSA and state 
wage and hour law); Complaint at 3, Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 
3:14-cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014) (same). These two suits have been 
consolidated, and the judge recently dismissed eight teams from the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction. See Order Re: Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Transfer at 47, Senne, 
v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS (2015). 
 12 See Complaint at 2, Wyckoff v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 1:15-cv-
05186 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) (claiming failure to pay overtime in violation of the 
FLSA). 
 13 See Complaint, Cooper v. LAC Basketball Club, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-04445 (C.D. 
Cal. June 10, 2014) (pursuing relief on behalf of a class of former unpaid interns for 
the Los Angeles Clippers). This suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice 
by the plaintiff. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Cooper v. LAC Basketball Club, Inc., 
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overtime lawsuits brought against professional sports teams by 
clubhouse attendants,14 stadium groundskeepers,15 and ticket sales 
and fan relations personnel.16 
At first glance, suits like Ms. Brenneman’s would appear to be a 
“slam dunk” (or touchdown, as the case may be) for the plaintiffs: an 
hourly wage of $2.85 is by all measures far below the $7.25 minimum, 
and a professional sports franchise worth over one billion dollars 
would likely be a particularly unsympathetic defendant in this context. 
However, the success of minimum wage and overtime lawsuits against 
professional sports teams is hardly guaranteed due to a relatively 
obscure exemption to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3), which relieves 
seasonal “amusement or recreational” establishments from minimum 
wage and overtime obligations. 
Courts that have considered this exemption to date have adopted 
differing approaches when applying Section 213(a)(3) to professional 
sports franchises because while sports teams clearly provide 
“amusement” services to the public, their operations may or may not 
qualify as “seasonal,” depending on whether one focuses only on the 
length of their playing season or the increasingly year-round nature of 
their business as a whole.17 This lack of uniformity has created 
uncertainty regarding the extent to which the FLSA covers amusement 
and recreation workers not only in the professional sports industry, 
but in other fields as well.18 
 
No. 2:14-cv-04445 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (No. 12). 
 14 See Adams v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(lawsuit by “batboys” who worked in team clubhouse). 
 15 See Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 592-93 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(lawsuit by stadium groundskeeper). 
 16 See Chen v. Major League Baseball, 6 F. Supp. 3d 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(lawsuit by fan relations volunteer); Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, 
565 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 (E.D. La. 2008) (lawsuit by sales and fan relations workers).  
 17 Compare Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596 (focusing on playing-season length), with 
Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1995) (focusing on year-
round operations).  
 18 For example, three FLSA lawsuits were filed in 2013 by immigrant workers with 
temporary visas employed by traveling carnivals and fairs, who asserted that they 
worked under extremely exploitative conditions and did not receive the minimum wage 
or overtime. See, e.g., Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Immigrant Justice Clinic & Centro 
de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc., Taken for a Ride: Migrant Workers in the U.S. Fair and 
Carnival Industry, at vi (Feb. 2013), http://www.cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/02/110145_Taken_for_a_Ride_Report_Final.pdf (describing state fair worker 
Samuel Rosales Rios who worked at a Greek food stand between sixteen and seventeen 
hours per day, sometimes at a wage of $1.00 per hour). The defendants in all three 
lawsuits defended themselves on the basis of § 213(a)(3). Amended Answer to 
Complaint at 17, Doe I v. Butler Amusements, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-03027 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
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Moreover, the fact that professional sports franchises — teams that 
are in many cases worth hundreds of millions or even billions of 
dollars19 — may be exempt from the FLSA raises questions about the 
exemption’s policy rationale. Because the exemption includes no 
revenue threshold, employers that can easily afford to comply with the 
law are nevertheless able to evade the basic wage and hour protections 
afforded to most workers. In addition, the fact that employees of 
professional sports teams may in some cases legally be paid sub-
minimum wages casts doubt on the true economic benefits these 
franchises impart to their host communities, undercutting the job 
creation and economic development justifications that teams 
frequently offer when seeking subsidies from taxpayers (often in the 
form of new, publicly financed stadiums or arenas).20 
While other FLSA exemptions have been the subject of much 
popular and academic attention,21 this seasonal amusement or 
 
22, 2014) (No. 70); Answer to Amended Complaint at 19, Garcia v. E.J. Amusements of 
N.H., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-12536 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2014); Amended Answer and 
Affirmative Defenses to Complaint at 2, Morales-Toledano v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc., 
No. 2:13-cv-14106-JEM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 62). The plaintiffs in Doe survived 
summary judgment on the question of the exemption’s application and the parties were 
in settlement talks as of December 2014. Doe v. Butler Amusements, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 
1125 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The Morales-Toledano plaintiffs dismissed their FLSA claims in 
January 2014, acknowledging the applicability of the exemption. Final Order of 
Dismissal With Prejudice, Morales-Toledano, No. 2:13-cv-14106-JEM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 
2014) (No. 77). The Garcia case is in discovery as of January 2015.  
 19 See, e.g., NFL Team Valuations, Dallas Cowboys, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/ 
teams/dallas-cowboys/ (last visited July 14, 2015) (listing team valuation as of August 
2014 as $3.2 billion). 
 20 See, e.g., New Vikings Stadium Economic Impact, MINNESOTAVIKINGS.COM, 
http://www.vikings.com/stadium/new-stadium/economic-impact.html (last visited July 
14, 2015) (“Not only will a Vikings stadium keep one of Minnesota’s biggest assets in 
the State, but building a new facility will also support thousands of jobs and generate 
significant economic activity at a time when the State desperately needs it. . . . Upon 
completion of the stadium, 3,400 full and part-time jobs will be supported by the 
economic activity generated by a new stadium.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial 
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1353-54 (1987) (describing the 
racist origins of the farmworker and domestic worker exemptions to the FLSA); 
Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal 
Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2220 (1998) (describing the “FLSA’s so-
called ‘white-collar exemptions’” as “the subject of controversy”); Regan C. Rowan, 
Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar Problem: An Analysis of the DOL’s Modernization of 
the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 119, 119 
(2004) (discussing FLSA overtime exemptions and citing the Wall Street Journal as 
commenting, “[w]ho should be eligible for overtime is a hot economic and political 
issue”). 
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recreation exemption has, to date, largely been ignored.22 This article 
therefore seeks to advance the existing academic literature on the 
FLSA and its exemptions by providing the first detailed consideration 
of Section 213(a)(3). The article begins in Part I by providing a brief 
primer on the FLSA and its exemptions, before tracing the origins and 
legislative history of Section 213(a)(3). Part II surveys the confused 
case law applying Section 213(a)(3) and proposes a simple new 
framework for analyzing defendants’ entitlement to the exemption. 
Using this framework, Part III then explores the status of professional 
sports teams under the exemption, ultimately concluding that when 
analyzed correctly, teams will often qualify for the Section 213(a)(3) 
exemption in at least some areas of their operations. Part IV concludes 
by examining the policy implications of this analysis, not only for the 
professional sports industry, but also for the FLSA’s exemptions 
generally. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FLSA AND SECTION 213(A)(3) 
A. The FLSA and Its Exemptions 
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 as a key component of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislative agenda.23 As described by 
the President, the legislation’s twin requirements of a minimum hourly 
 
 22 Three law review articles have mentioned the exemption in annual surveys of 
circuit court opinions. Christina A. Lorino et al., Eleventh Circuit: Survey of Recent 
Decisions, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 819, 865-67 (2009) (summarizing a 2008 Eleventh Circuit 
decision in which defendant raised § 213(a)(3) defense); Stephen W. Mooney & Leigh 
Lawson Reeves, Labor Law, 47 MERCER L. REV. 891, 896-97 (1996) (surveying the 
1995 labor law decisions by the Eleventh Circuit and summarizing the Jeffery v. 
Sarasota White Sox case discussed infra notes 144–46); E. Fredrick Preis, Jr., Labor 
Law, 36 LOY. L. REV. 885, 897-98 (1990) (summarizing a 1989 Fifth Circuit decision 
in which defendant raised § 213(a)(3) defense). Meanwhile, other articles that contain 
substantive analyses of workers’ FLSA rights mention the existence of the exemption 
in passing. See, e.g., Leda E. Dunn, Note, “Protection” of Volunteers Under the Federal 
Employment Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 472 n.46 
(1992) (listing § 213(a)(3) as an example of FLSA exemptions). Finally, one recent 
law review article focused on Section 213(a)(3) in the context of the circuit split 
currently existing between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, discussed in depth infra 
notes 144–55 and accompanying text. See Adam Epstein, Attack of the Cheerleaders! 
Allegations of Violations of the FLSA on an Uncertain Landscape, 21 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 23, 
30-31 (2015). 
 23 See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of 
Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1232 (2013) (“President 
Franklin Roosevelt pushed for the FLSA, a centerpiece of the New Deal, ‘to end 
starvation wages and intolerable hours.’”). 
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wage and premium overtime pay were intended to provide workers 
with “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”24 According to President 
Roosevelt, “A self-supporting and self-respecting democracy can 
plead . . . no economic reason for chiseling workers’ wages or 
stretching workers’ hours.”25 Yet, despite its noble aims, the FLSA 
contains a variety of exemptions that allow employers to deprive 
workers of the statute’s basic economic protections. Perhaps the most 
well-known of these provisions is the so-called “white collar” 
exemption, which denies overtime pay to “any employee employed in 
a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.”26 
Many domestic and farm workers likewise may not claim the 
minimum wage or overtime pay under the FLSA,27 and tipped workers 
such as restaurant wait staff receive a special, sub-minimum wage.28 
These exemptions lend a “Swiss cheese” character to the statute: at 
one time or another, seventeen separate occupations or industries have 
been exempt from both the minimum wage and overtime 
requirements,29 while another thirty have been exempt from the 
obligation to pay overtime.30 
Many of the FLSA’s exemptions have received significant scholarly 
and public attention, both for their seemingly haphazard nature and 
the sometimes troubling history explaining why particular groups of 
workers have been denied the statute’s protection. For example, as 
Professor Marc Linder pointed out in his exhaustive history of the 
farm and domestic worker exemptions, those occupations — 
traditionally held by African Americans — were carved out of FLSA 
coverage at the behest of white Southern Congressmen in exchange for 
their votes for the bill.31 Other exemptions are so specific as to suggest 
 
 24 A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (citing Message of the 
President to Congress, May 24, 1934). 
 25 Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a 
Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (1978), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ 
aboutdol/history/flsa1938.htm. 
 26 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012). 
 27 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (exempting some farmworkers from minimum wage and 
overtime protections); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (exempting casual babysitters and 
domestic companionship workers from minimum wage and overtime protections). 
 28 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2012) (setting out minimum wage requirements for tipped 
workers); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #15: TIPPED EMPLOYEES 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2013), available at http:// 
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs15.pdf (setting tipped workers’ required 
cash wage at $2.13 per hour). 
 29 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). 
 30 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). 
 31 Linder, supra note 21, at 1353-54 (“By the time the FLSA was drafted, the 
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similar trades of votes for special interest concessions.32 The FLSA 
exempts, for example, workers who catch, harvest, or process “fish, 
shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of 
animal and vegetable life;”33 “homeworker[s] engaged in the making 
of wreaths composed principally of natural holly, pine, cedar, or other 
evergreens;”34 and “switchboard operator[s] employed by an 
independently owned public telephone company which has not more 
than seven hundred and fifty stations.”35 As the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has commented: 
If there is any unifying principle underlying the exemptions in 
the FLSA, it is not evident in the Act’s words or its legislative 
history. Reading the Act’s legislative history and its 
exemptions leads one to conclude that the exemptions were 
created simply to ensure the Act’s passage.36 
Thus, there may not be, as President Roosevelt claimed, an 
“economic reason for chiseling workers’ wages or stretching workers’ 
hours,”37 but there appears to be a political one, as numerous 
occupations and industries have been exempted from the statute in 
exchange for the support of special interest groups. Not only does this 
hodgepodge of exemptions deprive many of our nation’s most 
vulnerable workers of basic economic protections, but the exemptions 
also present both administrative38 and statutory interpretation 
 
exclusion of farm workers from New Deal economic legislation had become such a 
fixed component of New Deal politics that the drafters no longer considered the issue. 
Consequently, understanding the purpose of the exclusion requires an examination of 
earlier New Deal legislation and the treatment accorded racial minorities by these 
programs. Only by analyzing the pervasive exclusions of minorities from the New 
Deal, especially the treatment accorded minority farm workers, is it possible to grasp 
the effect of racial discrimination on congressional consideration of the FLSA.”). 
 32 Glenn R. Moore, The Scope of Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 156 (1973) (“[S]ome industries which might have 
been compelled to comply with the terms of the Act appear to have been successful in 
lobbying so as to receive favorable treatment from its terms.”). 
 33 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(5). 
 34 29 U.S.C. § 213(d). 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(10). 
 36 Brennan v. Texas City Dike & Marina, Inc., 492 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 37 Grossman, supra note 25. 
 38 See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act: Is It Meeting the Needs of the Twenty-First 
Century Workplace?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections, Comm. on 
Educ. and the Workforce, 112th Cong. 26 (2011) (calling on Congress to amend the 
FLSA’s “complex, difficult to interpret, and hard to apply” white collar exemption); 
Yoram Margalioth, The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 117, 142 
(2006) (noting that the FLSA’s treatment of tipped employees “is quite confusing and 
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challenges,39 as employers struggle to determine which of their 
employees is and is not entitled to minimum wage and overtime 
protection. 
B. The Origins and Legislative History of Section 213(a)(3) 
Section 213(a)(3) exempts from the FLSA’s minimum wage and 
overtime protections: 
[A]ny employee employed by an establishment which is an 
amusement or recreational establishment . . . if (A) it does not 
operate for more than seven months in any calendar year, or 
(B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for 
any six months of such year were not more than 33 ⅓ per 
centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such 
year . . . .40 
Unlike other FLSA exemptions, this provision has received little 
popular or academic attention, though its impact on excluded workers 
is no less significant.41 And like many other FLSA exemptions, Section 
213(a)(3)’s presence in the statute seems to be largely driven by 
political expediency; its effect is to define some workers’ labor as being 
less valuable than others’ without any clear policy or economic 
rationale. 
The exemption’s origins date back to 1961, when a set of 
amendments was passed extending the minimum wage and overtime 
for the first time to retail and service workers, who previously had no 
such rights.42 However, this expansion was limited by an exemption 
for all retail or service employers with annual revenues below $1 
million, as well as employees of any “amusement or recreational 
establishment that operates on a seasonal basis” without regard to 
revenue.43 
 
does not seem to promote any clear policy goal”).  
 39 Texas City Dike, 492 F.2d at 1117 (“The absence of a unifying principle makes 
the exemptions’ interpretation a difficult task.”). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3). 
 41 See supra note 22. 
 42 See Brock v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255, 1256 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(“The original version of the exemption at issue here was enacted in the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1961.”); GERALD MAYER, BENJAMIN COLLINS & DAVID H. 
BRADLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA): AN OVERVIEW 
18 (2013).  
 43 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30 at 66 (1961) 
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) to extend FLSA coverage to retail and service 
  
2015] Gaming the System 133 
The amusement or recreational provision became its own stand-
alone exemption a few years later, in 1966, as part of another set of 
amendments.44 This new version, which still applies today, continued 
to cover all amusement or recreational establishments without regard 
to revenue, and now defined seasonality with reference to either the 
length of the establishment’s operations (seven months or less in any 
calendar year) or fluctuations in receipts between high and low 
periods (the low period’s average receipts must be one-third or less of 
the high period’s average receipts).45 
Courts have characterized the exemption’s legislative history as 
“skimpy” and “sparse.”46 However, statements in the relevant House 
and Senate Reports and debate in both houses of Congress provide 
some guidance regarding not only the types of employers that 
Congress envisioned falling within the exemption, but also Congress’ 
conception of seasonality. 
Scattered throughout the legislative history are various lists of 
employer types offered as illustrations of the exemption’s coverage. A 
1961 report by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, for 
example, describes establishments exempt under the provision as 
“typically those operated by concessionaires at amusement parks and 
 
employers with annual revenues over $1 million); id. at 71 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 
213(a)(2)(i)–(ii) to exempt retail and service employers not covered by § 203(s)(1) 
and, separately, seasonal amusement or recreational enterprises regardless of annual 
revenue); see also H.R. REP. NO. 87-75, at 98 (1961) (describing Senate version of 
1961 amendments as exempting from the FLSA “amusement and recreational 
establishments operating on a seasonal basis”); MAYER, COLLINS & BRADLEY, supra note 
42, at 18 (describing the 1961 FLSA amendments as requiring “employers of retail 
workers in enterprises with annual sales in excess of $1 million . . . to pay minimum 
wage and overtime rates”). 
 44 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 at 833 
(1966) (amending the FLSA to insert the current language of the exemption); Brock v. 
Louvers & Dampers, Inc., No. C-1-84-1291, 1985 WL 6452, at *13-14 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 17, 1985) (describing the legislative history of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)). 
 45 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3); Marshall v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 562 F.2d 
1323, 1329 (1st Cir. 1977) (“The current wording seems to have been intended to 
establish criteria for seasonality, and by eliminating the ‘retail and service’ language to 
make plain that employees of seasonal amusement or recreational companies generally 
are exempt.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Brennan v. Texas City Dike & Marina, Inc., 492 F.2d 1115, 1118 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (“Although it is skimpy, [the legislative history] suggests that the 
exemption does not cover establishments whose sole or primary activity is selling 
goods.”); Chen v. Major League Baseball, 6 F. Supp. 3d 449, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(describing the exemption’s legislative history as “sparse”); see also Brock, 1985 WL 
6452, at *13 (“The purpose of the amusement and recreational exemption is neither 
explained in the legislative history of the 1961 amendments nor the legislative history 
of the 1966 amendments.”). 
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beaches and [that] are in operation for 6 months or less a year.”47 This 
statement is replicated in the U.S. Department of Labor regulation 
implementing the exemption: “Typical examples of such are the 
concessionaires at amusement parks and beaches.”48 In addition, 
during the 1961 debates, a House member asked for and received 
confirmation that the exemption would apply to “dude ranches, 
seasonal operations . . . which operate for only 3 to 6 months of the 
year[.]”49 
In 1965, there was an unsuccessful effort in the House to eliminate 
the minimum wage portion of the exemption while retaining the 
overtime waiver.50 At the time, a report by the House Committee on 
Education and Labor characterized the exemption as applying to “such 
seasonal recreational or amusement activities as amusement parks, 
carnivals, circuses, sports events, parimutuel racing, sport boating or 
fishing, and other similar or related activities . . . .”51 
The following year, senators engaged in a relatively lengthy debate 
over the exemption’s scope during their deliberation of the 1966 FLSA 
amendments, which ultimately resulted in the passage of the 
exemption’s current version. The sticking point in the debate was the 
status of resort or recreational hotels. Senator A. Willis Robertson of 
Virginia sought to add language that would exempt “any hotel 
patronized by a majority of its guests primarily for recreational 
purposes.”52 He also sought to “give [employers] a little more 
favorable break” in the receipts test for seasonality.53 Instead of 
comparing average receipts between two six-month periods, Senator 
Robertson proposed comparing actual receipts for any five months 
with actual receipts for the other seven months.54 
Though Senator Robertson acknowledged that the exemption was 
originally “framed with reference to the recreational concessions in the 
national parks,”55 he and his allies argued that the expansion would 
 
 47 S. REP. NO. 87-145, at 193 (1961). 
 48 29 C.F.R. § 779.385 (2011). 
 49 107 CONG. REC. 4,792 (Mar. 24, 1961) (statement of Rep. Rogers). 
 50 H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 26-27 (1965). 
 51 Id. at 51. During the later debates over the 1966 amendments, a House member 
described the seasonal amusement or recreational exemption using nearly identical 
language. 112 CONG. REC. 11,293 (May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. O’Neill) 
(defining “amusement or recreational establishments” as “amusement parks, sports 
events, parimutuel racing, sport boating or fishing, and similar activities . . . .”). 
 52 112 CONG. REC. 20,596 (Aug. 25, 1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
 53 Id. at 20,593. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
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allow resort hotels to stave off “competition with hotels in Bermuda 
and offshore islands.”56 If U.S. resorts were subject to the FLSA, 
Senator Robertson feared that Congress “would be legislating 
unemployment.”57 Echoing white Southern advocacy for the farm and 
domestic worker exemptions almost thirty years before, Senator 
Robertson expounded on the job-destruction point in explicitly racial 
terms. He described the “fine group of colored waiters” who worked in 
the dining room at The Homestead, a luxury Virginia resort hotel.58 
According to Senator Robertson, these men “sing spirituals on Sunday 
mornings and wait on tables. They do not come in to look at empty 
chairs. [Failing to exempt hotels like the Homestead from the FLSA] 
will legislate them out of a job,” with the result that “those boys would 
not be in the dining room.”59 Although cast in ostensibly more 
benevolent terms, the end result of Senator Robertson’s position was 
the same as that pursued by his white Southern lawmaker 
predecessors: the exclusion of a set of African-American employees 
from the basic wage and hour protections of the FLSA. 
Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas countered Senator Robertson 
during the debates, characterizing the exemption as covering only 
amusement parks “which [are] open in the summer or in the winter. 
T[his] section has no application to hotels . . . .”60 According to 
Senator Yarborough, the exemption should properly apply only to 
truly seasonal operations. He noted that “census data indicate a trend 
for resort hotels to operate for longer periods of time each year. That is 
because in hot areas air conditioning has been developed. Also, some 
southern hotels are now manufacturing artificial snow for skiing and 
are installing ski lifts.”61 Even Senator Robertson acknowledged that 
resort hotels “have to operate all the year around, because if they do 
not keep their trained workers employed, they could not open up 
again when the busy season comes.”62 In the end, Senator 
Yarborough’s position carried the day, as the version of the exemption 
that was ultimately enacted in 1966, and is still in effect today, 
included none of Senator Robertson’s proposed language. 
 
 56 Id. (statement of Sen. Fannin).  
 57 Id. (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
 58 Id. at 20,594 (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (statement of Sen. Yarborough); see also id. at 20,791 (Aug. 26, 1966) (“We 
have an exemption in the bill for amusement parks. But this amendment would 
expand that language . . . .”).  
 61 112 CONG. REC. 20,792 (Aug. 26, 1966) (statement of Sen. Yarborough). 
 62 Id. at 20,593 (Aug. 25, 1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
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Thus, the legislative history, though relatively thin, suggests three 
things about Section 213(a)(3). First, the archetypal seasonal 
amusement or recreational establishment was seasonal in the 
climatological sense of the word, in that it was highly weather-
dependent. Each example of a covered enterprise in the legislative 
history tended to operate in the 1960s only in the warm months: 
amusement parks, beaches, dude ranches, national park concessions, 
carnivals, circuses, sports events, parimutuel racing, and sport boating 
or fishing.63 During the 1966 debates, Senator Yarborough even 
commented on the new phenomena of resort hotels’ using air 
conditioning and constructing artificial ski areas to defy the weather; 
his resistance to extending the exemption to these establishments 
suggests that such hotels were more resilient and stable, and less 
deserving of an exemption, than their truly seasonal counterparts. The 
exemption therefore seems crafted to provide protection to a class of 
businesses that would find payment of the minimum wage and 
overtime difficult due to the instability and economic vulnerability 
introduced by their short, weather-dependent operating seasons.64 
Second, the legislative history’s focus on summertime amusement or 
recreational operations suggests another potential motivation for the 
exemption’s passage. As the Tenth Circuit has speculated, the 
exemption may have been designed “to allow recreational facilities to 
employ young people on a seasonal basis and not have to pay the 
relatively high minimum wages required by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.”65 Although the exemption’s legislative history does not mention 
a specific intent to target young workers (a relatively powerless, 
economically vulnerable group),66 statements during the Senate debate 
 
 63 See id. 
 64 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar view of the intended coverage of the 
exemption: “The logical purpose of the provision is to exempt the type of amusement 
and recreational enterprises . . . which by their nature, have very sharp peak and slack 
seasons. These businesses argue that they should not be held to the same wage and 
hour requirements as permanent, year-round operations. Their particular character 
may require longer hours in a shorter season, their economic status may make higher 
wages impractical, or they may offer non-monetary rewards. Congress responded to 
these concerns by enacting the amusement and recreational exemption.” Brock v. 
Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir. 1987).  
 65 Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, 478 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1973).  
 66 See, e.g., Lara Queen Plaisance, Comment, You Want Fries with That Shake?: The 
Sexual Harassment of and Discrimination Against Teenage Workers, 77 UMKC L. REV. 
227, 227-28 (2008) (discussing young workers’ vulnerability to sexual harassment 
and discrimination on the job); Anthony J. Tucci, Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining 
How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 1363 (2012) (discussing young workers’ reluctance to enforce their 
  
2015] Gaming the System 137 
show that senators were aware that many summertime workers were 
students, and that the exemption would therefore necessarily affect 
this group of workers.67 Meanwhile, during the debate over a failed set 
of amendments to the FLSA a year earlier, senators openly discussed 
the impact that the seasonal amusement and recreation exemption had 
on younger workers. Opponents of the 1965 proposal — which would 
have eliminated the minimum wage exemption for seasonal 
amusement and recreational establishments, while preserving an 
overtime exception68 — expressed concern that requiring seasonal 
employers to pay the minimum wage would result in the elimination 
of a number of jobs held by students.69 These senators successfully 
argued that these younger workers could afford to earn a lower wage 
due to their dependent status, justifying the preservation of the 
minimum wage exemption.70 So in light of this legislative history — as 
well as the FLSA’s historic exclusion of other relatively less powerful, 
economically disadvantaged groups — the Tenth Circuit’s speculation 
that there may have been an age-based motivation behind Section 
213(a)(3) is plausible.71 
Third, the legislative history suggests that Congress could have 
relaxed the exemption’s seasonality test to “[give] . . . a little more 
favorable break”72 to employers, but chose not to. Indeed, the failure 
of Senator Robertson’s pro-employer receipts test proposal can be read 
 
employment rights and vulnerability to exploitation). 
 67 In debate, Senator Cotton expressed the concern that, if resort hotels were not 
included in the Section 213(a)(3) exemption, then students employed by resorts 
during the summer would lose their jobs because hotels could not afford to pay them 
the FLSA-mandated minimum wage and overtime. Senator Yarborough replied, in 
defense of the exclusion of resort hotels from the exemption, “I do not feel that there 
is a danger that students will lose employment for the summer. Their productivity is 
high and their energy is great. I am sure that the Senator has had the experience which 
I have had with the summer interns.” 112 CONG. REC. 20,595 (Aug. 25, 1966) 
(statements of Sens. Cotton and Yarborough).  
 68 H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 26 (1965) (describing a bill that “[r]epeals the 
minimum wage and overtime exemptions for such establishments [hotel, restaurant, 
motion picture, and recreational establishments; hospitals and related institutions] 
(except that seasonal resorts and seasonal recreational and amusement establishments 
maintain overtime exemptions)”). 
 69 111 CONG. REC. 21,830 (Aug. 25, 1965) (statement of Rep. Callaway) 
(describing a Georgia resort that “will not be able to employ any of these youngsters at 
the minimum wage because they are paying a lesser amount for these students who 
are not only unskilled but they are young children”).  
 70 Id. (describing the students as earning “a part of their livelihood” from seasonal 
jobs). 
 71 See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 72 112 CONG. REC. 20,593 (Aug. 25, 1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
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as consistent with statements by members of Congress in 1966 about 
the need to expand, rather than contract the FLSA. The preamble to 
the House bill that introduced the 1966 amendments notes that 
“despite the [FLSA’s] broad coverage terms . . . there is great need for 
extending the present coverage of the Act to large groups of workers 
whose earnings today are unjustifiably and disproportionately low.”73 
The rejection of Senator Robertson’s proposal might also be read as 
skepticism about waiving FLSA requirements for relatively lucrative 
businesses such as resort hotels. As a fellow senator asked Senator 
Robertson, “Is the Senator saying that a hotel that is affluent enough to 
charge a patron $60 a day cannot pay a worker $50 a week? Do I 
understand the Senator correctly?”74 By enacting a stricter receipts test 
as a measure of seasonality, Congress chose to extend FLSA coverage 
to more categories of workers and limit the exemption’s application to 
presumably less “affluent” categories of employers. 
II. STAGES OF A SECTION 213(A)(3) ANALYSIS 
Despite these modest insights from the legislative history — or 
perhaps because of their modesty — courts have struggled to 
consistently apply Section 213(a)(3).75 In the relatively few cases that 
have addressed the exemption,76 courts have failed to adopt a 
consistent, clear standard for measuring seasonality, instead often 
considering a number of factors that are irrelevant to the exemption’s 
focus on seasonal recreational or amusement employers.77 To remedy 
the confusion in the case law, the following Part proposes a simplified 
approach, rooted in the text of the statute and guided by its 
implementing regulations and legislative history. This new analytical 
 
 73 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1366, at 82 (1966). 
 74 112 CONG. REC. 20,791 (Aug. 26, 1966) (statement of Sen. Pastore). 
 75 Brennan v. Texas City Dike & Marina, Inc., 492 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 
1974) (“If there is any unifying principle underlying the exemptions in the FLSA, it is 
not evident in the Act’s words or its legislative history. . . . The absence of a unifying 
principle [behind the FLSA’s exemptions] makes the exemptions’ interpretation a 
difficult task.”); see also infra Part II.A (describing problems with courts’ identification 
of the establishment); infra Part III.A (describing courts’ confused precedent applying 
the exemption to professional sports teams). 
 76 A Westlaw search for opinions that mention § 213(a)(3) reveals only thirty-
three cases (excluding cases that generated more than one opinion) that addressed the 
exemption in more than passing language between the years 1972, the date of the 
earliest opinion, and January 2015. 
 77 See, e.g., infra note 121 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of a tourist 
company’s operations in Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 285, 287 
(10th Cir. 1973)). 
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framework consists of three steps: (1) identifying the relevant 
“establishment”; (2) determining the “amusement or recreational” 
nature of that establishment; and (3) evaluating seasonality by 
applying either the seven-month duration test to that establishment’s 
operations or the receipts test to its revenue. 
A. Identifying the Establishment 
Courts that have considered Section 213(a)(3) often treat the 
analysis as having only two steps: “The establishment must be (1) 
seasonal and (2) recreational.”78 These courts seem to assume that the 
“establishment” in question is simply the defendant named in the case, 
and then proceed to evaluate that defendant’s amusement or 
recreational and seasonal character. 
However, this commonly used approach creates problems when the 
defendant is engaged in different lines of business, some of which are 
amusement or recreational in nature, or some of which are seasonal, 
and some of which are not. How should courts approach, for example, 
a marina that sells boats, motors, and trailers year-round (a non-
recreational activity), but also provides seasonal dock access for boat 
launching (a recreational activity)?79 Must the defendant’s entire 
business be seasonal, or only the amusement or recreational 
functions? For that matter, must the entire business be devoted to the 
provision of amusement or recreational services?80 As discussed 
 
 78 Texas City Dike, 492 F.2d at 1117 (“The exemption contains two requirements. 
The establishment must be (1) seasonal and (2) recreational.”); see also, e.g., Bridewell 
v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1995) (requiring that the defendant 
“(1) must be an amusement or recreational establishment and (2) must not operate for 
more than seven months in a calendar year”); Ivanov v. Sunset Pools Mgmt. Inc., 567 
F. Supp. 2d 189, 192 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]here are two elements to the amusement and 
recreational exemption: (1) the employer must demonstrate that it qualifies as an 
‘amusement or recreational establishment’; and (2) the employer must show either 
that it does not operate for more than seven months a year or that its average receipts 
for six months of the prior year were not more than a third of its average receipts for 
the other six months.”). 
 79 See generally Texas City Dike, 492 F.2d at 1116 (describing varied functions of 
defendant marina). 
 80 These questions were anticipated in the debate in the House of Representatives 
over the 1966 FLSA amendments, during which Representative Udall asked, “[W]ould 
[the exemption] apply where you have one resort management running a souvenir 
and gift shop or general supply and grocery store, service station and garage and so 
forth, along with the hotel and restaurant — that is, all these allied activities under the 
one management. If all these activities are ancillary to a recreation activity which does 
meet the seasonality or average 6-month receipts criteria — if this is substantially all 
under one management and meets these criteria, would all of these activities be 
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further in Part III, infra, this question has proved particularly vexing 
in cases involving professional sports teams, giving rise to conflicting 
precedent on the question of the seasonality of the teams’ operations.81 
Courts can avoid many of these problems by first identifying the 
relevant establishment(s) at issue in the case before proceeding to the 
amusement or recreation and seasonality questions.82 Not only does 
this threshold step allow courts to engage in a cleaner, more focused 
inquiry, but it is also consistent with Section 213(a)(3)’s text, which 
refers to “any employee employed by an establishment which is an 
amusement or recreational establishment.”83 The phrase, “which is an 
amusement or recreational establishment” modifies “an 
establishment,” suggesting that the first task for the court is to find 
“an establishment” in the record, and then proceed with the remainder 
of the analysis.84 
 
exempt[?]” 112 CONG. REC. 11,367 (May 25, 1966) (statement of Rep. Udall). 
 81 Compare Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 596 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a baseball team was not required to pay overtime to a groundskeeper 
who worked at the stadium year-round because the team provided amusement only 
during its relatively short playing season), with Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 138-39 (holding 
on very similar facts to Jeffery that that year-round baseball stadium maintenance 
employees were entitled to overtime because the team continued to engage in business 
operations after the end of its playing season).  
 82 See Fair Labor Standards Act (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 28, 2006) (Opinion Letter) 
[hereinafter Opinion Letter on FLSA, Sept. 28, 2006], available at 2006 WL 3227792, 
at *1 (listing the first of three steps in the analysis of the exemption’s application as 
identifying the relevant establishment). 
 83 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2012). 
 84 As a technical matter, given that the exemption refers to “any employee 
employed by an establishment,” the true first question should be “What entity is the 
plaintiff’s employer?” However, this is a question relevant not only to the application 
of the exemption, but to the application of the FLSA as a whole. If the defendant feels 
that it is not properly named as a defendant — if, for purposes of the FLSA, the 
plaintiff was actually employed by a different entity — then the defendant has a 
separate argument to make in its defense, apart from the application of Section 
213(a)(3), that draws on the long and well-established body of case law that defines 
“employee” and “employ” for purposes of the FLSA. See, e.g., Ivanov v. Sunset Pools 
Mgmt. Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194-96 (D.D.C. 2008) (reciting the standards for 
holding an entity accountable as an employer under the FLSA).  
For purposes of the exemption itself, case law and regulations also distinguish 
between workers who are “employed in” a particular establishment and those who are 
“employed by” that establishment; only the latter category of workers are included. 29 
C.F.R. § 779.309 (2011) (“For example, if the manufacturer sends one of his 
employees to demonstrate to the public in a customer’s exempt retail establishment 
the products which he has manufactured, the employee will not be considered 
exempt . . . since he is not employed by the retail establishment but by the 
manufacturer. The same would be true of an employee of the central offices of a 
chain-store organization who performs work for the central organization on the 
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How, then, should a court identify the relevant establishment? 
While the FLSA’s text does not define the term, its regulations provide 
some guidance. As a starting point, 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 distinguishes 
between an “establishment,” defined as “‘a distinct physical place of 
business,’” and an “‘entire business or enterprise’ which may include 
several separate places of business.”85 Another regulation, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 779.303, elaborates on the establishment-enterprise distinction: 
The “enterprise” . . . may be composed of a single 
establishment. The term “establishment,” however, is not 
synonymous with the words “business” or “enterprise” when 
those terms are used to describe multiunit operations. In such 
a multiunit operation some of the establishments may qualify 
for exemption, others may not. For example, a manufacturer 
may operate a plant for production of its goods, a separate 
warehouse for storage and distribution, and several stores from 
which its products are sold. Each such physically separate 
place of business is a separate establishment. In the case of 
chain store systems, branch stores, groups of independent 
stores organized to carry on business in a manner similar to 
chain store systems, and retail outlets operated by 
manufacturing or distributing concerns, each separate place of 
business ordinarily is a separate establishment.86 
 
premises of an exempt retail outlet of the chain.”); see also Harvey v. Dunlop, No. 73-
874, 1975 WL 1204, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1975) (citing Wage-Hour Op. Letter 
No. 760 (Jan. 17, 1968), CCH Lab. L. Rep. P 25,223.30 (1975) (concluding that the 
recreational or amusement exemption was not applicable to the employees of an 
independent janitorial service provided on racetrack premises)). 
Meanwhile, if the employee works for more than one distinct establishment, then 
her entitlement to the minimum wage and overtime is determined on a per-workweek 
basis, depending on whether the establishment is exempt under all of the 
requirements of § 213(a)(3). If she works for exempt and non-exempt establishments 
during the same workweek, she is considered non-exempt, or entitled to the FLSA’s 
benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 779.311 (2011) (“[I]t may be stated as a general rule that if such 
an employer employs an employee in the work of both exempt and nonexempt 
establishments during the same workweek, the employee is not ‘employed by’ an 
exempt establishment during such workweek.”).  
 85 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (2011). 
 86 29 C.F.R. § 779.303 (2011); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.203 (2011) (“The 
coverage, exemption and other provisions of the [FLSA] depend, in part, on the scope 
of the terms employer, establishment, or enterprise. . . . The term employer . . . 
includes, with certain stated exceptions, any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer in relation to an employee. The term establishment means a 
distinct physical place of business rather than an entire business or enterprise. The 
term enterprise . . . is roughly descriptive of a business rather than of an establishment 
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Thus, under this pair of regulations, a “business” or “enterprise” may 
best be thought of as a legal entity, whereas an “establishment” is a 
physical one, defined with reference to the physical space it 
occupies.87 In this view, courts should treat each physically distinct 
outpost of a business as its own establishment for purposes of Section 
213(a)(3).88 
Other regulations complicate this simple line-drawing, however, 
contemplating the coexistence of multiple separate establishments in 
the same physical space. In such cases, 29 C.F.R. § 779.305 states that 
 
or of an employer although on occasion the three may coincide. The enterprise may 
consist of a single establishment (see § 779.204(a)) which may be operated by one or 
more employers; or it may be composed of a number of establishments which may be 
operated by one or more employers.”). 
In § 213(a)(3) cases, courts routinely cite regulations — such as 29 C.F.R. 779.303 
— that were issued pursuant to the retail and service establishment exemption, in 
which the seasonal amusement or recreational exemption was initially included. Thus, 
examples given in some regulations and cases feature retail or service workers rather 
than recreational or amusement workers. Only one district court has questioned the 
application of these regulations and precedent to § 213(a)(3); all remaining courts 
have adopted the retail and service exemption regulations and case law without 
question. This article does the same. Compare West v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., No. 07-
14335-CIV, 2008 WL 3270849, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008) (distinguishing retail 
and service exemption cases; stating that “the Court was concerned with a different 
exemption than the one at issue in this case”), with Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando 
Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing and relying on 
case law and regulations concerning the retail and service establishment exemption). 
 87 There is no requirement that an employer own the establishment at issue; 
leasing is sufficient. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
 88 Many § 213(a)(3) cases reflect this reliance on an establishment’s physical 
location. See, e.g., Alvarez Perez, 515 F.3d at 1157 (concluding that “when a part of a 
business complex seeks exemption as a separate establishment it must at least show 
that it has a physically separate place of business”); Chen v. Major League Baseball, 6 
F. Supp. 3d 449, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“FanFest was a sports event that was physically 
separate from the enterprise through which it was operated and controlled. In other 
words, the ‘establishment’ at issue here — as distinguished from the ‘enterprise’ that 
operated and controlled it — is defined by its discrete physical location.”); Wright v. 
Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc., No. C-12-0982 EMC, 2013 WL 1758815, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding that administrative office that was physically 
separate from the defendant’s other activities was its own, non-exempt establishment); 
West, 2008 WL 3270849, at *6 (rejecting an attempt by the plaintiff, a theater 
employee, to treat a city-owned theater (exempt) and the city as a whole (non-
exempt) as a single non-exempt establishment; stating, “Although the City certainly 
provides certain functions to the theatre as part of its ownership and control, the 
theatre is a distinct entity and it is undisputed that the theatre has a distinct physical 
location. Thus, the Court finds . . . that the theatre is the ‘establishment’ in this case 
and it is the distinct physical place of business and the City is entire business or 
enterprise”).  
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an establishment should be considered separate under the FLSA if “(a) 
It is physically separated from the other activities; and (b) it is 
functionally operated as a separate unit having separate records, and 
separate bookkeeping; and (c) there is no interchange of employees 
between the units.”89 In Feagley v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., for 
example, the district court considered the status of a poker room that 
was contained within a racetrack facility.90 While both the poker room 
and the track provided amusement and recreation services, only the 
racetrack could satisfy the seasonality test.91 Unsurprisingly, the 
plaintiff, a poker dealer, argued that the poker room was its own 
separate, non-exempt establishment; the defendant argued that the 
two were part of the same, exempt whole.92 The court denied 
summary judgment to the defendant in light of 29 C.F.R. § 779.305, 
noting unresolved questions of material fact regarding the 
establishment issue, such as “whether Silks Poker Room dealers are 
subject to the same managerial control as are other employees of 
Tampa Bay Downs,” whether the poker room and race track “were 
treated as distinct and autonomous economic units within the 
business,” the “markedly different business risks” borne by the two 
entities, the state regulations to which they were subject, the 
segregation of the two sets of receipts, and the level of “interchange” 
between the poker room dealers and other race track employees.93 
Another regulation introduces a fourth possible establishment 
configuration: a single establishment consisting of multiple separate 
physical locations. This regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9, was issued by 
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to 
interpret the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) — which prohibits sex 
 
 89 29 C.F.R. § 779.305 (2011). On the question of the interchange of employees, 
the regulation notes, “The requirement that there be no interchange of employees 
between the units does not mean that an employee of one unit may not occasionally, 
when circumstances require it, render some help in the other units or that one 
employee of one unit may not be transferred to work in the other unit. The 
requirement has reference to the indiscriminate use of the employee in both units 
without regard to the segregated functions of such units.” Id. 
 90 Feagley v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., No. 8:11-CV-564-EAK-MAP, 2012 WL 
2178857, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2012). 
 91 Id. at *4 (noting that the race track satisfied the receipts test for seasonality). 
 92 Id. at *2 (“Tampa Bay Downs argues that it is absolutely exempt . . . because it 
satisfies the so-called amusement and recreational establishment exemption of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act . . . . Feagley, for his part, argues that Tampa Bay 
Downs and the Silks Poker Room are actually two separate establishments for 
purposes of FLSA exemptions, and that the exemption is therefore inapplicable to him 
and his cohorts.”). 
 93 Id. at *5-6. 
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discrimination in pay — enacted as part of the FLSA.94 Though 
developed in the EPA context, courts have applied the EEOC’s 
“establishment” reasoning and regulation in Section 213(a)(3) cases.95 
According to 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9, though “each physically separate 
place of business is ordinarily considered a separate establishment,” in 
“unusual circumstances” courts may unite a defendant’s physically 
separate locations and consider them together as a single 
establishment.96 The regulation provides an illustration of such 
“unusual circumstances”: a business operates at multiple distinct 
physical locations, but in which “a central administrative unit may 
hire all employees, set wages, and assign the location of employment; 
employees may frequently interchange work locations; and daily 
duties may be virtually identical and performed under similar working 
conditions.”97 The Fifth Circuit applied this regulation in Brennan v. 
Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District, holding that 
female janitors suing for equal pay could treat the school district as a 
 
 94 The definition of “establishment” is important to the EPA analysis because the 
statute prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of sex within an “establishment.” 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer having employees subject to any provisions 
of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees 
are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in 
such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions.”).  
 95 See Doe v. Butler Amusements, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1134 n.5 (N.D. Cal., 
2014) (“In short, Defendant’s assertion that 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9 is applicable only to 
the Equal Pay Act and does not offer guidance as to the meaning of ‘establishment’ in 
the context of overtime and minimum wage claims asserted under the FLSA has no 
merit.”). 
 96 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9 (1981). 
 97 Id.; see also Paddell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 79-2303-M, 1979 WL 
1805, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 31, 1979) (relying on the remedial nature of the EPA, as 
part of the FLSA, to hold that multiple separate stores in a retail chain were part of a 
single establishment); cf. Shultz v. Hasam Realty Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1136, 1142-43 
(S.D. Fla. 1970) (“[T]he Diplomat clearly consists of a single establishment within 
meaning of the [FLSA]. Four of the five main facilities are on physically contiguous 
parcels of land. The Presidential Country Club and Golf Course is located some five 
miles from the other buildings, but only because the price of land at the time of its 
construction made it economically unfeasible for the Diplomat to provide its guests 
with additional golf facilities closer to the main hotel units. No separate books and 
records are kept for the various facilities. The general accounting department 
maintains payroll, financial, and accounting records for all Diplomat properties. Nor 
are employees hired to work solely in one of the five units. Hiring is done through a 
central office, and employees are interchanged between the various facilities, as 
needed.”).  
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whole — rather than the individual schools where they worked — as 
the relevant establishment under the EPA.98 Important to the court’s 
analysis were the facts that “the central administration of the school 
district (not the principals of the [individual] schools) hired the 
janitors, determined their wages, assigned them to the school building 
in which they were to work, and sometimes switched their 
assignments from one building to another.” Moreover, the court 
emphasized the facts that “the work schedule and the janitors’ daily 
duties [were] controlled to a large extent by the central administrators 
[and did] not differ from building to building.”99 
Taking these regulations together, then, a court may be required to 
decide among four potential visions of the establishment in a Section 
213(a)(3) case: (1) a single location housing a single establishment; 
(2) a single location housing multiple establishments; (3) multiple 
locations consisting together of a single establishment; and (4) 
multiple locations consisting separately as multiple establishments. 
Plaintiffs and defendants may argue, variously, to join or split 
locations, depending on which position allows the application or 
avoidance of the exemption. 
In choosing among competing establishment configurations, courts 
should adopt the “basic presumption,” derived from 29 C.F.R. § 
779.23 and 29 C.F.R. § 779.303, that “each such physically separate 
place of business is a separate establishment.”100 However, courts must 
also draw “establishment” lines in a way that limits the applicability of 
Section 213(a)(3). This is because the FLSA is a remedial statute and, 
as such, must be interpreted in the broadest possible manner, with any 
exemptions construed narrowly.101 So, in some cases, a court may 
 
 98 Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 99 Id. 
 100 29 C.F.R. § 779.303 (2011); The Equal Pay Act Interpretations, 51 Fed. Reg. 
29816, 29817 (Aug. 20, 1986). 
 101 As one court has observed, “The one strong thread running consistently 
through the great majority of these cases is that the courts have construed 
‘establishment’ so as to preclude application of the exemption. . . . The regulations of 
the Labor Department . . . show clearly that the Department defines ‘establishment’ so 
as to use it as a tool to obtain coverage and limit the exemption.” Dunlop v. N.H. 
Jockey Club, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.N.H. 1976). See also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. 
Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“The Fair Labor Standards Act was designed ‘to 
extend the frontiers of social progress’ by ‘insuring to all our able-bodied working men 
and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.’ Any exemption from such 
humanitarian and remedial legislation must therefore be narrowly construed, giving 
due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress. To 
extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms 
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need to look beyond physical location in order to give full effect to the 
FLSA’s remedial purpose. In performing this analysis, the First Circuit 
has advised courts “that a multi-faceted approach aimed at 
determining the integrity of separation between business units is in 
order . . . in contrast to single-minded reliance upon any one factor 
such as control, ownership or ‘physical location.’”102 The EEOC has 
also advocated for this totality of the circumstances approach, 
emphasizing that courts should be allowed “a measure of flexibility 
whenever called for by the facts of a given case . . . [as] certain factual 
situations may call for a restricted use of the term [“establishment”] 
while others may call for an expanded use.”103 
B. Determining the Establishment’s Amusement or Recreational Status 
Once the relevant establishment has been identified, the next step is 
to determine its “amusement or recreational” status.104 The FLSA and 
 
and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of 
the people.”) (citation omitted); Brennan v. Texas City Dike & Marina, Inc., 492 F.2d 
1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The ground rules for interpreting and applying FLSA 
exemptions disfavor the employer.”). 
 102 Marshall v. N.H. Jockey Club, Inc., 562 F.2d 1323, 1330-31 (1st Cir. 1977) 
(“[W]e think it appropriate to proceed beyond the regulation and look more broadly 
into ‘the integrity of the economic . . . and functional separation between the business 
units.’”); see also Mitchell v. T.F. Taylor Fertilizer Works, Inc., 233 F.2d 284, 286 (5th 
Cir. 1956) (considering “functional as well as geographical separation” in defining an 
establishment); West v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., No. 07-14335-CIV, 2008 WL 
3270849, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008) (describing the difference between situations 
in which it is “logical to treat the different parts of . . . businesses as separate 
establishments” and those in which “the different entities [are] clearly parts of an 
inseparable whole”). 
 103 The Equal Pay Act Interpretations, 51 Fed. Reg. at 29817; see also Montalvo v. 
Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1145 (5th Cir. 1970) (“When business activities of a 
single enterprise take place within a single distinct physical place of business, for 
purposes of coverage under the [FLSA] the employer should not be allowed to escape 
coverage for some of the employees involved by arguing that its business activities are 
separated into separate ‘establishments’ along functional lines.”). Compare Harvey v. 
Dunlop, No. 73-874, 1975 WL 1204, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1975) (rejecting a 
defendant’s attempt to claim the exemption by trying to unite multiple, physically 
separate, non-exempt establishments (horse breeding and training facilities) with 
other, exempt establishments (race tracks) into one exempt whole to which the FLSA 
would not apply), with Doe v. Butler Amusements, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (declining to grant summary judgment to the defendants, who had asked 
the court to consider multiple different traveling carnival sites as separate, exempt 
establishments). 
 104 See Opinion Letter on FLSA, Sept. 28, 2006, supra note 82, at *2 (explaining 
that “[t]he second step in applying section 13(a)(3) is to determine whether each 
establishment qualifies as ‘amusement or recreational’”). 
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its regulations do not define these terms, and the definition offered by 
the Eleventh Circuit — “[a] recreational establishment” is one that 
“sell[s] recreation or entertainment as its ‘principal activity’”105 — is 
unhelpfully circular. The Oxford Dictionary, in turn, defines 
“amusement” to mean “[t]he pleasurable occupation of the attention, 
or diversion of the mind”106; “recreation” is defined as a “pleasant 
occupation, pastime or amusement.”107 
The exemption’s legislative history provides some direction by 
listing some of the types of establishments that would be exempt 
under the provision, including “amusement parks, carnivals, circuses,” 
and those providing entertainment in the form of “sports events, 
parimutuel racing, sport boating or fishing” to the public.108 Moreover, 
the debate recounted above between Senators Robertson and 
Yarborough over the inclusion of resort hotels within the exemption 
also sheds some light on the applicability of the exemption.109 There, 
Senator Robertson proposed extending the exemption “not to tourist 
hotels, not to hotels in any of the cities, not to hotels in industrial 
areas, but to a resort hotel which can qualify as a recreational 
institution.”110 In particular, he cited as markers of a hotel’s 
recreational character its provision of activities such as golf, horse 
riding, tennis, fishing, skiing, and skeet shooting, as opposed to 
convention hotels whose sole purpose is to host meetings.111 
Importantly, the inquiry here does not focus on the plaintiff’s own 
specific job duties, but rather the “principal activity” of the 
establishment employing the worker.112 An accountant employed by 
 
 105 Mann v. Falk, 523 F. App’x. 549, 552 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 106 Amusement, THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 74 (1971). 
 107 Recreation, Id. at 2447. 
 108 H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 51 (1965). 
 109 See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text. 
 110 112 CONG. REC. 20,593 (Aug, 25, 1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Several courts have mistakenly suggested that the applicability of § 213(a)(3) 
should hinge upon whether the particular employee-at-issue’s job duties are 
themselves amusement or recreational in nature. See Brennan v. Six Flags Over 
Georgia, Ltd., 474 F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973) (“It is the character of the work, not the 
source of the remuneration, that controls.”); Hodgson v. Six Flags Over Georgia, Ltd., 
No. 14876, 1972 WL 945, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 1972) (“The designation given such 
employees by defendants is not controlling; it is the nature of the work performed by 
such employees which is controlling.”). However, a majority of courts have instead 
held that the nature of the individual’s work is irrelevant, concluding instead that the 
applicability of the exemption depends solely on the character of the establishment’s 
operations as a whole. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Tulsa Cnty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 85 F.3d 
494, 497 (10th Cir. 1996) (“By its own terms, § 213(a)(3) of the FLSA exempts 
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an otherwise exempt water park would be covered by Section 
213(a)(3), for example, even though the accountant does not provide 
any amusement or recreational related services herself. Similarly, a 
lifeguard at a non-exempt hotel swimming pool would be entitled to 
the protections of the FLSA, even though she is employed in what 
traditionally would be considered a recreational position. 
Along these lines, the establishment must provide recreation or 
amusement as its “principal activity.”113 In cases where the 
establishment’s principal activity is in dispute, courts should examine 
the establishment’s sources of revenue, and in particular discern 
whether the establishment generates the majority of its revenue from 
recreational or non-recreational sources. For instance, in Brennan v. 
Texas City Dike & Marina,114 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a 
lake marina was an amusement or recreational establishment. 
Although the marina did tailor its business toward customers engaging 
in recreational boating activities, the court nevertheless emphasized 
the fact that fifty-seven percent of the marina’s revenue came from 
boat sales.115 Consequently, the court held that the marina was not a 
recreational establishment because too large a percentage of its 
revenue came from non-recreational, commercial activities.116 
 
employees employed by amusement or recreational establishments; it does not exempt 
employees on the basis of the work performed at an amusement or recreational 
establishment. It is the character of the revenue producing activity which affords the 
employer the protection of the exemption.”); McMillan v. Boy Scouts of Am. — Aloha 
Council, No. 11-00430-SOM-BMK, 2012 WL 2282539, at *5 (D. Haw. June 15, 2012) 
(“Rather than focusing on the nature of the work, the applicable federal regulations 
state that the exemption ‘depend[s] on the character of the establishment.’”); Gibbs v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, 140 F. Supp. 2d 835, 843-44 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 
(“Finally, the Court rejects Gibbs’ argument that it should focus on the work that he 
performed, rather than the principal activities of the Defendant, when determining the 
applicability of the § 213(a)(3) exemption.”). Indeed, this view is consistent with both 
the statutory text and the applicable federal regulation. Section 213(a)(3) itself 
specifically states that “any employee employed by” a seasonal amusement or 
recreational establishment is exempt from the minimum wage and overtime laws. 29 
U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2012). Meanwhile, 29 C.F.R. § 779.302 clarifies that the 
exemptions set forth in the FLSA “depend on the character of the establishment by 
which an employee is employed. . . . Therefore, if the establishment meets the tests 
enumerated in these sections, employees ‘employed by’ that establishment are 
generally exempt.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.302 (1999). 
 113 Mann v. Falk, 523 F. App’x. 549, 552 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 114 492 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 115 Id. at 1116 (“[T]he marina derived fifty-seven percent of its income from selling 
boats, motors, and trailers.”). 
 116 Id. at 1119-20 (“[T]he marina’s principal activity is selling expensive 
recreational hardware. Therefore we conclude the marina is ineligible for exemption 
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Such a focus on revenue is also consistent with the approach 
proposed by the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) in 2004 in Chao v. 
Double JJ Resort Ranch.117 Proceeding on the assumption that the entire 
resort constituted a single establishment at issue in the case,118 the 
DOL — the plaintiff in the suit — proposed an “income test” to 
determine whether the resort’s “principal activity” was the selling of 
recreational activities (horseback riding and paddle boating, for 
example) or non-recreational activities like the operation of a gas 
station.119 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit concluded that adopting such a 
test was unnecessary in the case, believing that “common sense 
compel[s] our finding that Double JJ is not in the recreation business” 
in light of its “primary purpose [being] to sell foods and rent beds.”120 
Thus, when the amusement or recreational character of an 
establishment is in doubt, courts should examine the percentage of 
revenue coming from amusement or recreational operations. If a 
majority of that revenue is derived from the provision of amusement 
or recreational services, then the establishment would satisfy the 
second prong of this article’s proposed three-part test under Section 
213(a)(3). If the establishment’s non-recreational operations generate 
a majority share of its revenue, however, then the establishment would 
lack the requisite “amusement or recreational” status, and would not 
qualify for an exemption under Section 213(a)(3).121 
 
as an amusement or recreational establishment.”). 
 117 375 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 118 As later noted by the Chao court itself, the resort in question likely constituted 
multiple separate establishments when properly analyzed. See id. at 398 (“[W]e 
cannot, on this record, declare that Double JJ is one establishment and thus wholly 
subject to the Act.”). 
 119 Id. at 398 (“The Secretary asks that we adopt an ‘income test’ to guide our 
analysis, but we do not think it necessary to do so in this case.”). 
 120 Id. 
 121 If an establishment’s “principal activity” is not the provision of amusement or 
recreation, then it will fall outside the exemption, even if its operations are linked to 
and help support another establishment’s provision of amusement or recreational 
services. For example, in Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 285, 287 
(10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit divided the company overseeing tourist operations 
at Yellowstone National Park into multiple separate establishments, concluding that 
the company’s accounting, marketing, and maintenance operations were not 
amusement or recreational in nature, and therefore not entitled to protection under 
the exemption. Id. at 290. 
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C. Evaluating the Seasonal Nature of the Establishment 
Finally, assuming the relevant establishment is primarily engaged in 
amusement or recreational operations, a court must consider whether 
it operates on a seasonal basis.122 An establishment can satisfy Section 
213(a)(3)’s seasonality requirement based on either (A) the duration 
of its operations or (B) the timing of its receipt of revenue. 
1. Duration of the Establishment’s Operations 
First, under Section 213(a)(3)(A), an establishment will be 
considered seasonal if “it does not operate for more than seven months 
in any calendar year.”123 Assuming the court has properly identified 
the establishment (as discussed in Part II.A above), its compliance 
with this provision should be relatively easy to determine based simply 
on the number of months that it was open to the public during the 
relevant year(s) in question.124 So, for example, a water park that is 
only open for business seven or less months per year would generally 
satisfy subsection (A)’s seasonal duration requirement, while a park 
open eight or more months per year would not. 
This would be true even if some of the water park’s employees 
worked more than seven months per year. As the DOL’s Wage and Hour 
Division explained in an opinion letter considering the applicability of 
the exemption to lifeguards employed at a public beach: 
The fact that some of the lifeguards [may] work more than 
seven months in the year maintaining [beach] equipment 
would not serve to deny the exemption under section 
13(a)(3), provided the establishment (the beach) is not open 
 
 122 Opinion Letter on FLSA, Sept. 28, 2006, supra note 82, at *2 (stating that “[t]he 
final step in applying section 13(a)(3) is to determine whether each [establishment] 
meets the requirements of section 13(a)(3)(A) regarding the duration of [its] 
operation or section 13(a)(3)(B) regarding [its] receipts”). 
 123 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 124 Notably, subsections (A) and (B) of Section 213(a)(3) differ with respect to 
how they each frame the relevant year in question. In subsection (A), Congress chose 
the phrase “in any calendar year,” while in subsection (B), discussed infra Part II.C.2, 
it said “during the preceding calendar year.” Compare id. (not limiting the relevant 
time period to the previous calendar year), with 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B) (limiting the 
relevant time period to only the “preceding calendar year”). Thus, it appears that the 
applicability of subsection (A) should be determined based on the number of months 
the business was open to the public during the calendar year in which the alleged 
violation occurred, while the applicability of subsection (B) is based on the receipts 
the business received the year before the alleged FLSA violation arose.  
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as a recreational facility . . . for more than seven months in any 
calendar year.125 
Similarly, an amusement park open to the public six months per year 
would still properly satisfy subsection (A) even if it employed 
someone on a year-round basis to maintain its landscaping. Indeed, a 
DOL Fact Sheet regarding Section 213(a)(3) specifies that “[i]f an 
establishment engages only in such activities as maintenance 
operations or ordering supplies during the ‘off season’ it is not 
considered to be operating for purposes of the exemption.”126 
Thus, assuming that the court has correctly identified the proper 
establishment in question, applying subsection (A)’s seasonal duration 
requirement will typically be relatively straightforward. Assuming that 
the establishment at issue engages in only minimal off-season 
operations, it will qualify for protection under subsection (A) if it is 
only open to the public for seven months or less per year; otherwise, 
the establishment will presumptively remain subject to the FLSA. 
2. Receipt of the Establishment’s Revenues 
If an establishment does not meet Section 213(a)(3)(A)’s seasonal 
duration test, it may nevertheless claim exempt status under 
subsection (B) if, “during the preceding calendar year, its average 
receipts for any six months of such year were not more than 33 1/3 per 
centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such 
year.”127 In other words, for example, if an establishment receives an 
average of at least three times as much income between the months of 
April and September as it averages for October through March, it will 
qualify as a seasonal establishment despite operating on a year-round 
 
 125 Fair Labor Standards Act (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 24, 1975) (Opinion Letter), 
available at 1975 WL 40933 (quoted in Fair Labor Standards Act (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 
14, 2009) (Opinion Letter), available at 2009 WL 648997, at *2). DOL opinion letters 
“are normally entitled to a high degree of deference, [but] they are not binding on the 
court if they are plainly erroneous or are inconsistent with the regulations they 
interpret.” Imada v. City of Hercules, 138 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 126 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #18: SECTION 13(A)(3) 
EXEMPTION FOR SEASONAL AMUSEMENT OR RECREATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER THE 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/ 
regs/compliance/whdfs18.pdf. A DOL fact sheet “is not binding law, particularly 
where . . . it runs afoul of the binding authority.” Joseph v. Nichell’s Caribbean 
Cuisine, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Courts, however, are 
free to treat a fact sheet as persuasive authority if they agree with the analysis 
contained therein. See id.  
 127 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B). 
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basis.128 This provision allows businesses with a “sharp, but short, 
peak [season] to remain unhindered by the FLSA’s [minimum wage 
and] overtime requirements.”129 
When analyzing an establishment’s receipts under subsection (B), 
courts employ a so-called “cash” method — as opposed to an 
“accrual” method — of accounting.130 Under the cash method, the 
actual date upon which a business receives its income is 
determinative.131 So, for instance, if a private golf course were to 
receive seventy-five percent or more of its annual revenue in the form 
of membership dues between the months of November and March, it 
would be exempt from the FLSA under the cash method of accounting 
even if the course operates on a year-round basis.132 In contrast, under 
an accrual method of accounting, income would not be considered 
earned until the services being purchased had actually been proffered 
to the customer.133 Thus, under such an approach, the private golf 
course above would see its membership dues prorated across twelve 
months, disqualifying it from coverage under subsection (B). 
This focus on the date that payment is received, rather than when it 
actually accrues to the business, is consistent with subsection (B)’s use 
of the term “receipt.”134 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “receipt” to 
mean the “[a]ct of receiving; also, the fact of receiving or being 
received.”135 Thus, because Congress selected a word focused on the 
actual acceptance of income, rather than the date on which it is 
ultimately considered earned, courts have reasoned that applying a 
 
 128 To be clear, the months in question need not be sequential. If a business can 
show that its average revenues for any six months in a year — say, January, March, 
May, July, September, and November — satisfy the receipts test then it will be 
considered an exempt establishment. 
 129 Derrig v. Rich Harvest Farms Co., No. 08-C-7193, 2010 WL 375188, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2010). 
 130 See, e.g., Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 830 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(explaining the two accounting methods and affirming the district court’s choice of 
the cash over accrual method); Hays v. City of Pauls Valley, 74 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (refusing to pro rate defendant’s income, as under the accrual method). 
 131 See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 830 (“Under the cash method of accounting, a 
company records money as income the moment it is received.”). 
 132 See Hays, 74 F.3d at 1006 (refusing to prorate golf course dues received in a 
three-month period over a full calendar year).  
 133 See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 830 (“[T]he accrual method of accounting does not 
record money as income until the underlying obligation (e.g., delivery of the product, 
performance of the service, etc.) has taken place.”).  
 134 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 135 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (6th ed. 1990). 
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cash method of accounting is appropriate under subsection (B).136 
Nevertheless, some have criticized the focus on the date that revenue 
is received, contending that “the accrual method of accounting best 
reflects the operation of” many recreational businesses.137 While this 
may be true, the majority rule’s focus on the actual date that revenue is 
received is reasonable given Section 213(a)(3)’s emphasis on the 
seasonal duration of the establishment’s operations.138 Indeed, the fact 
that a business receives a disproportionate share of its revenue in a 
relatively short period of time tends to suggest that its operations are, 
effectively, seasonal in nature.139 
Consequently, so long as a recreational establishment can show a 
six-month low period during which its average receipts are, at most, 
only one-third of the other six month’s average receipts, it will be 
exempt under Section 213(a)(3)(B). If not, the establishment remains 
subject to the FLSA. 
III. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS AND SECTION 213(A)(3) 
The status of professional sports teams as seasonal amusement or 
recreational establishments under Section 213(a)(3) has generated a 
sizeable percentage of the exemption’s existing precedent.140 The 
application of the FLSA remains an important issue for the industry, as 
at least eleven different lawsuits alleging violations of the minimum 
wage and overtime laws have been filed against sports teams in 2014 
 
 136 See, e.g., Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 830 (adopting the district court’s holding that 
“the statute speaks in terms, not of income, but in terms of receipts”).  
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. at 832-33 (Cole, J., concurring) (arguing that “I believe that it is quite 
logical that Congress chose not to exempt an organization like the Reds from paying 
an employee like Daisy S. Pearl an additional $2.75 per hour above her regular rate of 
$5.50 per hour for overtime hours, because the Reds clearly benefit financially by 
receiving significant amounts of its revenue in the off-season”).  
 139 See Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, 565 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 
(E.D. La. 2008) (“The FLSA’s ‘receipt’ test is logical, fair and an accurate assessment of 
the year round activity of an organization.”).  
Admittedly, this focus on the date that a business receives its revenue may be 
susceptible to some manipulation, as it is possible a business could strategically 
require customers to make all payments within a six-month period of time in order to 
qualify the business as seasonal under § 213(a)(3)(B). 
 140 Of the thirty-three cases filed before January 2015 that addressed § 213(a)(3) 
substantively, five of those cases involved the professional sports industry. See supra 
note 76; see also Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 592 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 137 (6th Cir. 1995); Chen v. Major League 
Baseball, 6 F. Supp. 3d 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Liger, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 681-82; 
Adams v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
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and 2015.141 However, because prior courts in sports team cases have 
often failed to properly identify the establishment at issue — 
conflating the team’s game-day and general business operations — the 
existing precedent in this area is both inconsistent and confused. As a 
result, additional clarity in this area of the law is needed. 
A. Existing Precedent Applying Section 213(a)(3) to Professional Sports 
Teams 
While prior courts applying the exemption agree that professional 
sports teams provide amusement services, they disagree as to whether 
the teams operate on a seasonal basis. On the one hand, a sports 
team’s actual provision of amusement to the public typically occurs 
only during its playing season, which may last seven months or less, 
satisfying subsection (A).142 On the other hand, a team’s general 
business operations usually continue year-round, with a significant 
number of its ticket sales, sponsorship agreements, and player 
transactions occurring during the off-season.143 As a result, some 
courts have focused solely on the length of the team’s playing season 
when applying subsection (A), while others have emphasized the 
entirety of the team’s business operations. 
For example, in Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc.,144 the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a minor league baseball team was exempt from the 
FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions based on the length of 
its playing season. The court rejected a claim for overtime by the 
team’s grounds keeper, noting that the team’s playing season lasted 
only five months — from April through August — and thus fell below 
Section 213(a)(3)(A)’s seven-month seasonality threshold.145 Even 
though the grounds keeper continued to maintain the team’s playing 
facility during its off-season — and thus himself worked more than 
seven months per year — the court emphasized that the proper focus 
was “on [the] length of the Defendant’s seasonal operation[s]” 
 
 141 See supra notes 1, 6–9 & 11–13 (listing seven lawsuits by NFL cheerleaders, 
two lawsuits by minor league baseball players, one lawsuit by MLB scouts, and one 
lawsuit by an NBA team intern). 
 142 See infra notes 193–205 and accompanying text. 
 143 See James T. Reese et al., National Football League Ticket Transfer Policies: Legal 
and Policy Issues, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 163, 165 (2004) (noting that most season 
ticket sales occur during the off-season). 
 144 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 145 Id. at 596 (“Defendant’s operation at the baseball complex in Sarasota lasts 
approximately five months each year which is two months less than the seven month 
period afforded under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3).”). 
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themselves, since Section “213(a)(3) does not require Defendant to 
completely shut down or to terminate every employee at the end of 
each baseball season.”146 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit considered the entirety of a sports 
team’s business operations when applying subsection (A) in Bridewell 
v. Cincinnati Reds.147 In Bridewell, a group of five stadium maintenance 
employees sued MLB’s Cincinnati Reds for unpaid overtime.148 In 
response, the team contended that it was exempt insofar as its regular 
playing season lasted seven months or less (from April through late-
September or early-October).149 Although the district court had 
initially ruled in the Reds’ favor, concluding that each of the team’s 
home games was a separate, single-day establishment under 
subsection (A),150 the Sixth Circuit reversed.151 The appellate court 
stressed that exemptions under the FLSA should be construed 
narrowly,152 and determined that “the duration of the Reds’ overall 
operation,” rather than the length of the team’s playing season, formed 
the relevant inquiry under subsection (A).153 The court concluded that 
even though the team only provided amusement to its customers 
seven months per year, it actually operated year-round, as evidenced 
by the fact that the team employed 120 people twelve months per 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 148 See id. at 138 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the five plaintiffs were suing 
on their own behalf and on the behalf of other “maintenance and cleaning co-
workers”); Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, No. C-1-93-203, 1994 WL 866091, at *1 
(S.D. Ohio March 24, 1994). 
 149 See Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 138 (summarizing defendant’s argument); Bridewell, 
1994 WL 866091, at *1. 
 150 Bridewell, 1994 WL 866091, at *1 (“Each game played by The Reds at 
Riverfront Stadium therefore constitutes a sporting event. Accordingly, the Magistrate 
Judge correctly concluded that The Reds qualify for the Amusement and Recreational 
Establishment exemption for the years 1991, 1992, and 1993.”). As discussed infra, 
the district court’s determination that each individual game was a separate 
establishment was erroneous given the applicable regulations’ focus on physical places 
of business. See infra note 163. 
 151 Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 139. 
 152 Id. at 138 (“The Reds have the burden of establishing entitlement to the 
exemption, which we construe narrowly.”). 
 153 Id.  
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year.154 As a result, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Reds were not 
exempt under subsection (A).155 
Similarly, the court in Liger v. New Orleans Hornets rejected an NBA 
team’s attempt to claim exempt status under Section 213(a)(3)(A).156 
Liger involved a claim for unpaid overtime by former ticket sales and 
fan relations employees of the New Orleans Hornets.157 Relying on the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridewell,158 the district court determined 
that the Hornets were, in effect, a year-round operation, and thus 
ineligible for protection under subsection (A).159 In particular, the 
court emphasized the fact that the Hornets’ season could potentially 
last as long as nine months per year once potential pre- and 
postseason games were factored in.160 Moreover, as in Bridewell, the 
court noted that the team employed more than 100 people on a year-
round basis.161 Consequently, the court concluded that the team was 
not a seasonal establishment, and thus not exempt from the FLSA.162 
The conceptual differences between the Jeffery, Bridewell, and Liger 
courts regarding the duration of a sports team’s operations underscore 
the importance of properly identifying the relevant establishment at 
issue in the suit. In none of these three cases did the deciding court 
attempt to precisely define the establishment in question.163 Instead, 
 
 154 Id. at 139 (“While a truly seasonal business that employs an insignificant 
number of workers year-round could conceivably qualify for the exemption, the fact 
that the Reds employ 120 year-round workers compels the conclusion that they 
‘operate’ year-round.”). 
 155 Id. (“Because the Reds operate for more than seven months in a calendar year, 
they were not entitled to summary judgment based upon 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3).”). 
 156 Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, 565 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. La. 2008). 
 157 Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-1969, 2006 WL 
2850157, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 04, 2006). 
 158 Liger, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (“The Plaintiffs’ reliance on Bridewell is more 
appropriate.”). 
 159 Id. (“[T]he Court finds that the Hornets are a year-round operation, and thus, 
cannot qualify for the exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A).”). 
 160 Id. (“[T]he NBA regular season typically begins in October and ends in April; in 
combination with pre-season and post-season games, the Hornets have the 
opportunity to participate in games for nine months each year.”). In addition, the 
court also noted that the team participated in each June’s NBA Draft, and thus 
“operate[d] in the summer even when they do not make the playoffs.” Id. 
 161 Id. (“The Hornets admit that they employ over 100 personnel in year round 
positions.”). 
 162 Id. (“[T]he Court finds that the Hornets are a year-round operation, and thus, 
cannot qualify for the exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A).”). 
 163 See generally Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 1995); Liger, 565 F. Supp. 2d 680. 
The district court in Bridewell did define the applicable establishment, albeit too 
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all three courts simply assumed that as the defendant in the case, the 
entire team itself — including both its game-day and general business 
operations — constituted one establishment under the FLSA.164 
In fact, only one prior court has taken the predicate step of defining 
the applicable establishment in question in a case applying Section 
213(a)(3) to a professional sports team.165 In Adams v. Detroit Tigers, 
several former batboys sued MLB’s Detroit Tigers, alleging that the 
team had failed to pay them in accordance with the FLSA’s minimum 
wage and overtime provisions.166 The district court began its analysis 
by defining the relevant establishment to be only the Tigers’ in-
stadium, game-day operations — which lasted for fewer than seven 
months167 — rather than the year-round operations of the franchise as 
a whole.168 This finding became largely irrelevant to the analysis, 
however, as the district court was bound to follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
earlier ruling in Bridewell, holding that professional baseball teams 
were “a year-round operation” that could not “qualify for an 
exemption under the seven-month test” set forth in subsection (A).169 
The Adams court did go on to hold that the Tigers fell within Section 
213(a)(3)(B)’s receipts provision, though, insofar as the team’s average 
off-season receipts were less than one-third of its average in-season 
receipts.170 
 
narrowly. Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, No. C-1-93-203, 1994 WL 866091, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio March 24, 1994) (holding that each game played by the Reds was a separate 
establishment). Indeed, given the applicable regulations’ focus on physical places of 
business, the district court’s conclusion that each game played by a baseball team was 
a separate establishment was clearly erroneous considering that all of those games 
were housed in the same facility. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (2011) (generally defining 
“establishment” as “a ‘distinct physical place of business’”). 
 164 See Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 596; Bridewell, 68 F.3d at 138-39; Liger, 565 F. Supp. 2d 
at 684.  
 165 In addition to the Adams case, discussed infra notes 166–70, the district court in 
Bridewell reached an erroneous conclusion regarding the establishment at issue in the 
suit, as discussed above. See supra note 163. 
 166 Adams v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(“Plaintiffs chiefly claim that they were not paid overtime compensation and 
minimum wages for their work, in violation of state and federal laws.”). 
 167 Id. at 180 (“[I]t is undisputed that Tiger games are not played during the 
months of November through March, limiting batboys’ employment to only seven 
months of the year.”). 
 168 See id. at 179-80 (“An ‘establishment’ is a ‘distinct physical place of business’ — 
in this case, the Tigers’ establishment at Tiger Stadium, and not the Tigers’ 
organization as a whole.”). 
 169 Id. at 180. 
 170 Id. (“[F]or each year from 1992 to 1995, the average of six months of off-season 
receipts ⅓is less than 33  of the average of in-season receipts for the rest of the year.”). 
  
158 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:123 
Thus, existing courts applying Section 213(a)(3) to professional 
sports teams are split, with two courts (Jeffery and Adams) holding 
that the teams were exempt from the FLSA, while two others 
(Bridewell and Liger) have held that the year-round nature of sports 
teams operations as a whole disqualified them from protection under 
the exemption. 
B. The Proper Analysis of Professional Sports Teams Under Section 
213(a)(3) 
1. Identifying the Establishment 
As noted above, courts considering the status of professional sports 
teams under Section 213(a)(3) have, to date, largely failed to properly 
define the relevant establishment at issue in the litigation.171 This 
oversight is particularly significant because, when properly defined, 
professional sports teams may often consist of multiple 
establishments, some of which may qualify for seasonally exempt 
status, and others of which will not.172 Indeed, most sports teams’ 
operations can generally be divided into two categories: those directly 
dealing with the team’s in-stadium, game-day operations (such as 
parking, concessions, and grounds keeping), and those relating to its 
general business operations (e.g., general accounting, marketing, 
merchandising, and sponsorship solicitation functions). Thus, by 
correctly identifying the relevant establishment, courts can avoid 
much of the conceptual difficulty entailed in determining the seasonal 
duration of a team’s operations. 
The relevant question under this first step of a Section 213(a)(3) 
analysis is whether a team uses one establishment or multiple 
establishments to conduct its diffuse game-day and general business 
operations. As discussed in Part II.A above, under the applicable 
regulations, a business unit occupying a “distinct physical place of 
business” is usually considered a separate establishment for purposes 
of Section 213(a)(3).173 In many cases, both a team’s game-day and 
 
However, because the plaintiffs did not contest these figures, it is unclear if the team’s 
receipts revenue was calculated correctly. See id. (“Since plaintiffs do not dispute 
Fisher’s calculations, the Tigers have shown that they are an establishment qualifying 
for an exemption from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.”); 
see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing § 213(a)(3)(B)). 
 171 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 173–87 and accompanying text. 
 173 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (2011). 
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general business operations will be located in a single facility — its 
stadium or arena — thereby presumptively rendering the team a single 
establishment under 29 C.F.R. § 779.23. Should a team house some or 
all of its business operations in a separate location, however, then 
those units of the business would usually constitute a separate 
establishment under this same regulation.174 
Even in cases where all of a team’s employees are housed in a single 
facility, though, its business and game-day operations may 
nevertheless properly be considered different establishments under 29 
C.F.R. § 779.305, which delineates separate establishments located on 
the same premises. As previously noted,175 courts applying this 
regulation consider three factors when deciding whether separate 
establishments exist within a single facility: physical separation of 
activities, separation of record- and book-keeping, and interchange of 
employees.176 
The DOL applied these three factors in an opinion letter to a 
professional sports team in 1978, ruling that even though the team’s 
administrative business offices were located within its arena, they 
nevertheless constituted a separate, non-exempt establishment from 
the team’s game-day operations.177 Indeed, a team’s business 
operations will often be housed in a physically separate part of the 
stadium, with minimal overlap between the team’s business and game-
day-related employees (the former of which will typically be employed 
year-round, while the latter generally work on a seasonal basis).178 
Moreover, a team’s business operations will usually be functionally 
separate from its game-day operations.179 Employees within the team’s 
 
 174 Professional sports teams would not appear to present the type of “unusual 
circumstance” that would warrant combining multiple separate physical locations into 
a single establishment under 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9, since teams generally do not operate 
at multiple distinct locations with a central administrative unit assigning employees to 
different, frequently changing work locations. See supra notes 96–99 and 
accompanying text. 
 175 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 176 See Chao v. Double JJ Resort Ranch, 375 F.3d 393, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(reciting standard). 
 177 Fair Labor Standards Act (Dep’t of Labor Oct. 11, 1978) (Opinion Letter), 
available at 1978 WL 51434, at *1 (“It is also evident that the administrative offices of 
the *** comprise a separate establishment on the premises of the Arena.”). 
 178 See, e.g., id. (noting that the team in question did not maintain its 
administrative offices in a section of the arena in “which the general public has 
recourse for its amusement or recreation”). 
 179 See, e.g., Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-1969, 2006 WL 
2850157, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2006) (characterizing ticket sales employees of the 
New Orleans Hornets as working “in the ‘business enterprise’ of the organization”). 
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general business establishment primarily conduct non-recreational, 
traditional business functions such as accounting, contract 
negotiation, corporate sponsorship solicitation, and general marketing 
services.180 Meanwhile the team’s game-day establishment operates to 
provide amusement or recreational services directly to the public. 
Thus, while the extent to which a team maintains separate records and 
bookkeeping for its business and game-day operations may vary on a 
case-by-case basis, it appears that a sports team will often consist of 
two different establishments under the applicable regulations.181 
Admittedly, a suit involving a team’s ticket sales department will 
likely present the most challenging scenario under this framework. On 
the one hand, ticket sales are directly related to the team’s provision of 
game-day recreational services. On the other hand, many ticket sales 
— season tickets, advanced single game tickets, group tickets — will 
be sold by the team’s general business office, often during the non-
playing season.182 Therefore, depending on the facts, a court may 
properly conclude that a team’s advanced ticket sales activities make 
up part of its general business operations, while walk-up game-day 
ticket sales at the stadium or arena box office are part of the game-day 
establishment.183 
 
 180 See, e.g., Front Office Directory, DETROITTIGERS.COM, http://detroit.tigers.mlb. 
com/team/front_office.jsp?c_id=det (last visited June 24, 2015) (identifying separate 
corporate sales, finance, marketing, and ticket sales departments within the 
organization of MLB’s Detroit Tigers). 
 181 This suggested demarcation mirrors the approach recently adopted by the 
district court in Hill v. Delaware North Companies Sportservice, Inc., a case involving 
the applicability of § 213(a)(3) to concessionaires working at Oriole Park at Camden 
Yards, the home stadium of MLB’s Baltimore Orioles. No. 11-cv-00753-WMS-JJM 
(W.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014). In particular, the Hill court concluded that the Orioles’ 
baseball stadium constituted the relevant establishment for purposes of determining 
the applicability of the exemption. Id. at 5 (“[T]he relevant establishment (that is, the 
‘distinct physical place of business’) is Oriole Park at Camden Yards, not the Orioles 
team.”). 
In addition, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also correctly focused heavily on 
the proper characterization of the relevant establishment in its recent decision in Chen 
v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No. 14-1315-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2015). In 
particular, the Chen court held that MLB’s All-Star week FanFest convention was itself 
a stand-alone establishment for purposes of applying § 213(a)(3). Id. at *22 (“[W]e 
agree with the district court that for purposes of the Section 13(a)(3) exemption, 
FanFest constitutes a separate establishment.”). 
 182 See, e.g., Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, No. C-1-93-203, 1997 WL 1764776, at 
*3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 1997) (stating that MLB’s Cincinnati Reds receive “a significant 
portion of its revenue, i.e., income, from season tickets in the off-season”). 
 183 Meanwhile, should the same employee sell tickets in both an advanced and 
game-day capacity, then they would likely be considered to work for the non-exempt 
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Furthermore, in some cases a team’s game-day operations may 
themselves properly be divided into multiple separate establishments. 
For example, all thirty MLB teams stage a month-and-a-half-long 
preseason schedule with games held in either Florida or Arizona in 
February and March.184 Because these “spring training” games are 
staged in a “distinct place of business” apart from the teams’ normal 
site of operations, they normally would be considered a separate 
establishment under 29 C.F.R. § 779.23.185 Similarly, many NFL teams 
sell (or provide complimentary) tickets enabling their fans to watch 
the team’s preseason practice sessions.186 Since these practices are 
usually held at a location apart from the team’s game-day stadium,187 
they may also typically constitute a separate establishment. 
2. Determining the Establishment’s Amusement or Recreational 
Status 
Once the applicable establishment has been identified, the next step 
under Section 213(a)(3) will be to consider whether that 
establishment is sufficiently amusement or recreational in nature.188 In 
cases where a team’s game-day and general business operations are 
both properly considered part of a single, common establishment, then 
the court must consider whether the team’s “principal activity” — as 
determined by its majority revenue source — is its amusement-related, 
game-day operations or its non-exempt, general business activities.189 
In most cases, the general business operations will likely generate a 
 
general business establishment under 29 C.F.R. § 779.311, discussed above. See supra 
note 84. 
 184 See Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major 
League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. 
L. 265, 267 n.7 (2011) (noting that MLB “operates two spring training leagues, one in 
Florida and another in Arizona”). 
 185 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (2011). In fact, a MLB team’s spring training operations may 
actually constitute two separate establishments, one for the team’s spring training 
business operations, and the second for its game-day provision of recreational 
entertainment to the public. 
 186 See, e.g., Training Camp Schedule, BUFFALOBILLS.COM, http://www.buffalobills. 
com/team/training-camp/practice-schedule.html (last visited June 6, 2015) (stating 
that “[t]ickets are needed for [certain] practices”).  
 187 See id. (stating that the Bills’ practices are held at St. John Fisher College in 
Pittsford, NY). 
 188 See Opinion Letter on FLSA, Sept. 28, 2006, supra note 82, at *2 (explaining 
that “[t]he second step in applying section 13(a)(3) is to determine whether each 
establishment qualifies as ‘amusement or recreational’”). 
 189 See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text.  
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greater share of the team’s revenue, making the entire team a single, 
non-exempt establishment. This is due to the enormous revenues 
generated by a team’s general business operations, including most 
notably the team’s television broadcast agreements, which are 
negotiated by the team’s business staff and can be worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year.190 
Meanwhile, in cases where a team’s game-day and business activities 
qualify as separate establishments, the analysis will vary depending on 
which segment of the team’s operations are at issue. Because a sports 
team’s game-day operations provide amusement or recreational 
services directly to the public, those facets of its business will 
presumably almost always satisfy this second stage of the analysis. 
Meanwhile, a team’s general business operations would not qualify as 
an amusement or recreational establishment, as those portions of the 
enterprise conduct non-recreational business activities. In this regard, 
the correct analysis will follow Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, in 
which the Tenth Circuit held that the accounting, marketing, and 
maintenance offices at Yellowstone National Park were not 
amusement or recreational establishments.191 This phase of the 
analysis will thus typically end the inquiry in cases dealing with 
workers in a sports team’s business operations, as those portions of the 
enterprise will not qualify as an amusement or recreational 
establishment and thus fall outside the Section 213(a)(3) exemption. 
3. Evaluating the Seasonal Nature of the Establishment 
In cases where a team’s game-day operations constitute a separate 
establishment, the final factor a court will have to consider is whether 
that establishment operates seasonally.192 Under subsection (A)’s 
duration test, this inquiry will predominantly focus on the length of the 
team’s playing season. Not only will such an analysis vary from league 
to league, but it may even differ from franchise to franchise within a 
 
 190 See, e.g., Wendy Thurm, Dodgers Could Be Last Team to Strike Gold with Local 
TV Deal, FANGRAPHS.COM (July 26, 2013), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/dodgers-
could-be-last-team-to-strike-gold-with-local-tv-deal/ (reporting that some MLB teams 
earn as much as $340 million per year from their local television broadcast 
agreements). 
 191 Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 285, 290 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 192 Opinion Letter on FLSA, Sept. 28, 2006, supra note 82, at *2 (stating that “[t]he 
final step in applying section 13(a)(3) is to determine whether each [establishment] 
meets the requirements of section 13(a)(3)(A) regarding the duration of [its] 
operation or section 13(a)(3)(B) regarding [its] receipts”). 
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particular league depending on how far each team advances into 
postseason play, thereby extending the length of its playing season. 
For example, the game-day operations for NFL teams will typically 
qualify as seasonal establishments under subsection (A) due to the 
relatively short duration of the league’s playing season, from 
September to December.193 Even if one were to also factor in the 
team’s preseason games in August — which, unlike the practice 
sessions discussed above,194 are typically held at a team’s regular 
season stadium — the longest a team’s season could run would be 
seven months, assuming the club made it all the way to the Super 
Bowl in February.195 As a result, it appears that NFL teams’ game-day 
employees, such as ticket takers, ushers, concessionaires, and parking 
attendants, generally will not be entitled to the FLSA’s minimum wage 
and overtime protections. 
Similarly, MLB teams’ game-day operations will often qualify as 
seasonal establishments under subsection (A) as well. The MLB 
regular season typically runs six months, from April through 
September,196 although in some years the season may begin in March 
and/or extend into early-October.197 Meanwhile, ten MLB teams will 
qualify for the playoffs each year, typically held in October (but 
 
 193 See, e.g., Vinnie Iyer, 2014 NFL Schedule Release: Who Will Be Seahawks’ Opening 
Opponent?, SPORTINGNEWS.COM, http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2014-04-21/ 
2014-nfl-schedule-release-regular-season-seahawks-kickoff-opener-broncos-packers-
49ers-patriots-bears-cowboys-redskins (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). The NFL regular 
season has, on occasion, extended into January. See, e.g., NFL 2011 Regular Season 
Week 17 Schedule, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/schedules/2011/REG17 (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2015) (showing the 2011 NFL regular season ending on January 1, 2012). 
 194 See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 195 See, e.g., David Steele, NFL Preseason Schedule 2014: Seahawks, Broncos Meet 
Again, SPORTINGNEWS.COM, http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2014-04-09/nfl-
preseason-schedule-2014-tv-date-time-giants-bills-regular-season-schedule-seattle-
denver-super-bowl-rematch (last visited July 26, 2015). 
 196 For example, the 2013 MLB season began for most teams on April 1, 2013 and 
ended on September 30, 2013. See Schedule, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/ 
schedule/index.jsp?tcid=mm_mlb_schedule#date=03/31/2013 (last visited June 6, 
2015) (showing the start of the regular season); Schedule, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb. 
com/mlb/schedule/index.jsp?tcid=mm_mlb_schedule#date=09/29/2013 (last visited 
June 6, 2015) (listing the end of the regular season). 
 197 See, e.g., Schedule, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/index.jsp? 
mode=14r&tcid=mm_mlb_schedule#date=03/31/2014 (last visited June 6, 2015) 
(revealing that MLB’s 2014 regular season began on March 31, 2014); Schedule, 
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/index.jsp?tcid=mm_mlb_schedule#date= 
10/01/2012 (last visited June 6, 2015) (showing the end of MLB’s 2012 regular season 
to be October 3rd). 
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occasionally creeping into November).198 Therefore, in most cases, a 
team’s game-day operations will last seven months or less. However, 
should a team host a regular season game in March, and also continue 
playing into October, then its season would span eight months, 
disqualifying it from relying on subsection (A).199 
The exempt status of NBA franchises’ game-day operations may also 
vary depending on whether the team in question qualifies for the 
playoffs in a particular year. The NBA regular season generally lasts 
seven months, beginning in late-October and ending in early-April.200 
And though NBA teams — like those in the NFL — typically host 
preseason games in their regular season arenas, the NBA’s preseason 
schedule is generally limited to the month of October, meaning that 
most teams will still only operate for seven months per year, thus 
qualifying their game-day operations for seasonal status under 
subsection (A).201 However, should a team advance deep into the NBA 
playoffs, then its season could extend as many as eight or nine months 
in a year, in which case its game-day operations would no longer be 
exempt from the FLSA.202 
Finally, National Hockey League (“NHL”) teams also generally play 
a seven-month regular season schedule, starting in early-October and 
 
 198 See 2010 MLB Postseason Schedule, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/ 
ps.jsp?y=10 (last visited June 6, 2015) (noting that the 2010 World Series ended on 
November 1st). 
 199 Moreover, some MLB franchises may also potentially be disqualified from 
reliance on subsection (A) by virtue of the fact that they offer their fans the 
opportunity to tour the team’s stadium on a year-round basis, thus extending the 
duration of a team’s provision of in-stadium, amusement or recreational services 
beyond the seven-month threshold required under subsection (A). See, e.g., Stadium 
Tours, GIANTS.COM, http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/sf/ballpark/information/index. 
jsp?content=tours (last visited Sept. 29, 2015) (noting that the team offers fans tours 
of its stadium year-round); Stadium Tours, YANKEES.COM, http://newyork.yankees.mlb. 
com/nyy/ballpark/stadium_tours.jsp (last visited June 6, 2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Miami Marlins Case ID 1703046, Narrative Report, at 3 
(Feb. 11, 2014) (concluding that MLB’s Miami Marlins were not exempt under 
Section 213(a)(3)(A) in part because they offered year-round tours of their stadium). 
 200 See Dan Devine, 2013–14 NBA Schedule Released, YAHOO.COM (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nba-ball-dont-lie/2013-14-nba-schedule-released-30-
teams-schedules-224020884.html (noting that the NBA’s 2013–14 season was 
scheduled to begin on Oct. 29, 2013). 
 201 See, e.g., NBA’s 116-game Preseason Tips Off in Istanbul on Oct. 5, NBA.COM, 
http://www.nba.com/2013/news/08/15/nba-preseason-schedule-release-2013/ (last visited 
June 6, 2015) (stating that the NBA 2013 preseason begins October 5th). 
 202 See NBA Playoffs 2014 — The Finals Schedule, NBA.COM (June 1, 2014, 12:41 
AM), http://www.nba.com/2014/news/06/01/nba-finals-schedule/ (last visited June 6, 
2015) (reporting that the 2014 NBA Finals would potentially last until June 20th). 
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ending in early-April.203 Unlike their NBA counterparts, however, the 
NHL’s preseason schedule begins each year in September, with games 
generally held in each team’s regular season home arena,204 meaning 
that NHL teams will usually operate for at least eight months per year 
(and maybe more depending on how far they advance in the 
playoffs).205 Consequently, when viewed properly, NHL teams will 
rarely qualify as seasonal establishments under subsection (A) because 
the combined length of their pre- and regular season schedules will 
almost invariably span more than seven months in a given year. 
Should a professional sports team’s game-day operations fail to 
satisfy subsection (A), then the team will have to try to establish its 
seasonal status under subsection (B)’s receipts test. As discussed 
above, a team’s advanced ticket sales will often be a part of its business 
establishment, meaning that the team’s game-day revenues will be 
derived primarily from walk-up ticket, parking, food, and in-stadium 
merchandise sales.206 Considering the relatively short duration of the 
playing seasons in the four major sports,207 most teams will therefore 
likely satisfy the receipts test under subsection (B) with respect to 
their game-day operations. Indeed, the average in-stadium receipts 
generated by a team during its lowest six months will usually be less 
than one-third its average receipts for its six highest months, since the 
team’s game-day operations will only generate de minimis revenue 
during the off-season. The DOL’s San Francisco field office, for 
example, recently closed an investigation into the cheerleader pay 
practices of the NFL’s Oakland Raiders, concluding that the team was 
exempt from the FLSA under subsection (B).208 Thus, although the 
 
 203 See, e.g., NHL Announces 2013–14 Season Schedule, NHL.COM (July 19, 2013, 1:05 
PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=678238 (reporting that the 2013–14 “NHL 
regular season opens on Tuesday, Oct., 1” and “concludes on Sunday, April 13”). 
 204 See id. (listing important dates in the 2013–14 NHL preseason and regular 
season).  
 205 See 2013–14 NHL Preseason Begins Saturday, Sept. 14, NHL.COM (Aug. 8, 2013, 
10:00 AM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=679789 (stating that the NHL’s 
2013 preseason schedule would begin on September 14th). 
 206 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra notes 193–205 and accompanying text. 
 208 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Oakland Raiders Case ID 1717965, 
FLSA Narrative Report, at 3 (Feb. 26, 2014) (“The employer was able to provide 
documentation that disclosed that during each preceding calendar year of the time 
covered during the investigative period, its average receipts for any six months of such 
year were not more than 33-1/3 per centum of its average receipts for the other six 
months of such year.”). Unfortunately, the field office’s opinion did not include any 
supporting data, nor specify whether it relied on the cash method of accounting. See 
generally id. 
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applicability of subsection (B) to a sport team’s game-day operations 
will require a heavily fact-dependent, case-by-case inquiry, it appears 
that most teams’ game-day operations will likely qualify as exempt 
establishments under the provision. 
C. Implications for Pending FLSA Cases Against Professional Sports 
Teams 
Professional sports teams in three of the four major U.S. professional 
sports leagues have been sued recently for alleged minimum wage or 
overtime violations. As noted above,209 seven such lawsuits have been 
filed by cheerleaders against five different NFL teams, alleging that the 
franchises have effectively paid their cheerleaders as little as $2.85 per 
hour once all of the cheerleaders’ required duties — practices, game-
day performances, and other public appearances — are factored in.210 
These pay practices are particularly troubling considering that NFL 
cheerleading squads have been estimated to generate as much as $1 
million per year in revenue for their team,211 with teams sometimes 
charging upwards of $300 per hour to have their cheerleaders appear 
at private events.212 Meanwhile, some of these same NFL franchises 
reportedly pay the male employees who don mascot costumes 
anywhere from $35,000 to $65,000 per season.213 Although several of 
the pending cheerleader lawsuits assert only state law claims,214 others 
allege violations of the FLSA,215 thus implicating the status of NFL 
teams under Section 213(a)(3). Moreover, considering that 
cheerleaders and dance squad members in both the NBA and NHL 
 
 209 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Brenneman Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. The five teams are the Buffalo 
Bills, Cincinnati Bengals, New York Jets, Oakland Raiders, and Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 
See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 211 Rob Wherry, Pom-Poms and Profits, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.forbes. 
com/free_forbes/2003/0915/084.html (“[O]n average the 25 teams that have 
cheerleaders probably gross just over $1 million a season.”). 
 212 See Brenneman Complaint, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]he Cincinnati Bengals charge 
approximately the same rate for their cheerleaders to appear at events as other NFL 
organizations, or around $300 an hour.”). 
 213 Grant Cohn, NFL Cheerleading a Rah Deal, PRESS DEMOCRAT (June 24, 2014), 
http://49ers.pressdemocrat.com/nfl-cheerleading-rah-deal/ (“NFL mascots earn between 
$35,000 and $65,000 a season.”). 
 214 See, e.g., Sanchez Complaint, supra note 6; Caitlin Y. Complaint, supra note 6; 
Class Action Complaint, Lacy T. v. Oakland Raiders, No. RG14710815 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 22, 2014); Krystal C. Complaint, supra note 8; Jaclyn S. Complaint, supra note 9. 
 215 Collective Action Complaint, Pierre-Val v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, No. 14-cv-
1182-T-33EAJ (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2014); Brenneman Complaint, supra note 1, at 13-15. 
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may also be subjected to similar pay practices, teams in those leagues 
could soon be facing their own lawsuits under the FLSA.216 
Meanwhile, all thirty MLB teams are currently defending themselves 
in two class action lawsuits asserting that they have violated the 
FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions.217 In Senne v. Office of 
the Commissioner of Baseball218 and Marti v. Office of the Commissioner 
of Baseball,219 former minor league baseball players allege that they 
earned as little as $3,000 to $7,500 per year220 despite being required 
to spend well over forty hours per week at the stadium before, during, 
and after their six or seven scheduled games per week.221 These duties 
are in addition to their mandatory, but unpaid, pre- and postseason 
training obligations.222 The MLB defendants have responded to these 
allegations by asserting, inter alia, that they are exempt from the FLSA 
under Section 213(a)(3).223 
 
 216 See Julia Lurie, The Freezing, Hungry Lives of NHL “Ice Girls,” MOTHER JONES 
(June 11, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/philadelphia-flyers-
ice-girls-los-angeles-kings-new-york-rangers-stanley-cup-finals (reporting that NHL 
ice dancers are subject to treatment similar to NFL cheerleaders); Rachel L. Swarns, 
Dancing for the Knicks Is a Coveted Opportunity, but the Salary Is a Secret, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/nyregion/knicks-are-mum-
about-salaries-of-the-teams-dancers.html?_r=0 (stating that the salaries paid to 
cheerleaders for the NBA’s New York Knicks are secret). 
 217 In addition to these two minor league wage suits filed under the FLSA, a class 
action antitrust lawsuit was filed on behalf of minor league baseball players in 
December 2014. Class Action Complaint, Miranda v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 
No. 14-cv-05349 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). This suit faces long odds of success, 
though, in light of MLB’s exemption from antitrust law. See, e.g., Nathaniel Grow, 
Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework for Determining the Scope of 
Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 UC DAVIS L. REV. 557, 565-75 (2010) 
(discussing the origins and development of baseball’s antitrust exemption). 
 218 No. 14-cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014). 
 219 No. 3:14-cv-03289-RS (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). 
 220 See Second Amended Complaint at 36, Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of 
Baseball, No. 14-cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2014) (“Plaintiffs believe that most 
minor leaguers earn less than $7,500 per calendar year. Some earn $3,000 or less.”). 
 221 See id. at 39 (“In a seven-day workweek — which is typical — the minor 
leaguer consequently works well in excess of forty hours at the stadium.”).  
 222 See id. at 33 (stating that “minor leaguers work without earning a paycheck” 
during the required spring training practice sessions); id. at 36-37 (“At the end of the 
championship season, around 30–45 minor leaguers per MLB Franchise are also 
selected to participate in an instructional league to further hone their skills . . . 
without pay.”); id. at 38 (“[T]he Defendants therefore require players to perform 
extensive training and conditioning during the winter off-season.”). 
 223 See Answer to the Second Amended Complaint at 72, Senne v. Office of the 
Comm’r of Baseball, No. 14-cv-00608-JCS (“Plaintiffs’ claims and those of certain 
putative collective members under the FLSA are barred by the exemptions afforded 
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In addition to these pending class action lawsuits, MLB teams are 
also facing a series of investigations into their pay practices by the 
DOL.224 A September 2013 memorandum to all thirty MLB teams 
reports that the DOL believes that FLSA violations “are endemic to 
[the baseball] industry,”225 with three MLB teams — the Miami 
Marlins, Oakland Athletics, and San Francisco Giants — having 
already reportedly reached settlements with the DOL in which the 
teams agreed to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in back wages to 
various groups of team employees.226 
Finally, both MLB itself and the NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers have 
faced recent lawsuits brought by unpaid volunteers or interns, 
litigation that similarly alleges a failure to abide by the FLSA’s 
minimum wage and overtime provisions.227 Indeed, given their 
“glamour” industry status, professional sports teams may often be able 
to rely on unpaid volunteers and interns, exposing the teams to FLSA 
liability if a court determines that these workers are, in fact, employees 
eligible for protection under the FLSA. Fear of this sort of lawsuit 
reportedly motivated the NFL to discontinue its use of some unpaid 
volunteer positions at the 2014 Super Bowl.228 
 
to . . . seasonal, amusement or recreational establishments.”). 
 224 See Myron Levin & Stuart Silverstein, Investigation of Pay Practices Targets Two 
More Major League Teams, the Orioles and A’s, FAIRWARNING (May 22, 2014), http:// 
www.fairwarning.org/2014/05/investigation-pay-practices-major-league-baseball-
expands-two-teams/ (stating that four MLB “clubs that have come under scrutiny for 
possible violations of U.S. wage standards”). 
 225 Memorandum from Robert D. Manfred, Jr. & Dan Halem to All Presidents and 
Club Counsel (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.fairwarning.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/10/Sept.-12memo.pdf. 
 226 See Josh Eidelson, Oakland A’s Will Pay Back Wages to Interns and Clubhouse 
Workers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/ 
2014-09-05/oakland-as-will-pay-back-wages-to-interns-and-clubhouse-workers (reporting 
that the Oakland Athletics agreed to pay “86 current or former” employees “a total of 
$266,358” in back pay); Levin & Silverstein, supra note 224 (reporting that the Miami 
Marlins agreed to pay “$288,290 in back wages and damages to 39 team employees, 
including clubhouse and office staff,” while the San Francisco Giants will pay “$220,793 in 
back wages and damages to 78 employees”). 
 227 Class Action Complaint at 19-20, Chen v. Major League Baseball, 6 F. Supp. 3d 
449 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2013) (No. 13-CV-5494) (alleging that MLB violated the FLSA by 
failing to pay volunteers at the annual FanFest exhibition held in conjunction with the 
All-Star Game); Complaint at 2, Cooper v. LAC Basketball Club, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-
04445 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (pursuing relief on behalf of a class of former unpaid 
interns for the Los Angeles Clippers). 
 228 See Tom Pedulla, The Price for Super Bowl Volunteers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/sports/football/use-of-volunteers-questioned-as-
nfl-revenue-soars.html (reporting that “[t]he N.F.L. opted to hire temporary paid 
workers for positions in which volunteers had typically been used” in “apparent 
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The pending lawsuits against the NFL, MLB, and NBA are likely to 
have mixed success should courts apply the analysis proposed in this 
article. For example, the NFL teams appear to have a strong chance of 
prevailing in the pending lawsuits brought by their cheerleaders, since 
the cheerleaders will usually be affiliated with a team’s game-day 
operations. The NFL franchises will therefore be able to assert exempt 
status in the cases as a seasonal amusement or recreational 
establishment under Section 213(a)(3)(A), given the relatively short 
duration of the NFL playing season.229 
In response, the cheerleaders’ best argument may be to assert that 
their squads constitute a separate establishment apart from their 
team’s general game-day operations.230 For instance, unlike most of a 
team’s game-day staff, cheerleaders are required to attend many 
practice sessions and make a number of other non-game-day 
appearances.231 Thus, the majority of the cheerleaders’ duties are 
arguably functionally separate from the rest of the team’s game-day 
operations. Should the required practice sessions and promotional 
appearances be held at physical locations that are separate from the 
team’s stadium, and should the team maintain separate records and 
bookkeeping for its cheerleader squad, then the cheerleaders will have 
an even stronger claim for separate establishment status. If a court 
ultimately concludes that the cheerleader squads do in fact constitute 
a separate establishment, then their operations may not satisfy 
subsection (A)’s seasonal duration requirement, as the squads typically 
operate for eight or nine months per year (from late-May to December 
or January).232 Even then, though, the cheerleading establishment may 
itself satisfy subsection (B)’s revenue test, depending upon when any 
cheerleader-related revenues are received. 
Similarly, the pending class action lawsuits brought on behalf of 
minor league baseball players against MLB may also be barred by the 
Section 213(a)(3) exemption. Because most minor league players are 
employed directly by a MLB franchise — rather than their minor league 
team — MLB teams can plausibly argue that each of their minor league 
 
response to a class-action suit brought . . . against Major League Baseball”). 
 229 See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 231 See, e.g., Brenneman Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that cheerleaders for 
the Cincinnati Bengals “are required to attend at least 6–8 hours of mandatory 
practices every week from late May through December” and “are required to appear at 
no fewer than 10 ‘charity’ functions a season”). 
 232 See id. at 2 (noting that the Cincinnati Bengals’ cheerleaders practice “every 
week from late May through December”). 
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affiliate teams constitutes a separate establishment under the FLSA. 
Indeed, because each minor league franchise operates in a “distinct 
physical place of business” apart from its MLB parent club,233 these 
teams would appear to satisfy the standard for physically separate 
establishments set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 779.23.234 The minor league 
players could argue in response that their case presents one of the 
“unusual circumstances” in which physically separate operations 
constitute a single establishment under 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9, since the 
MLB franchises assign their minor league players to a variety of 
geographically diverse locations.235 However, even if a court were to 
determine that the minor league teams are not separate establishments, 
and do in fact constitute part of each MLB franchise’s game-day 
operations as a whole, as noted above, most MLB teams’ game-day 
operations will presumably qualify for seasonally exempt status under 
Section 213(a)(3)(A) or (B).236 Thus, it appears that the minor league 
players’ lawsuits will also be excluded from the FLSA’s coverage. 
Finally, though the recent class action filed by an unpaid intern of 
the Los Angeles Clippers was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice 
by the plaintiff,237 if it or a similar case is refiled, the court will have to 
determine whether the interns were employed in the Clippers’ 
business or game-day operations. Indeed, because the lead plaintiff 
reportedly “worked in the NBA team’s fan relations department, where 
he made calls to season-ticket holders and helped organize basketball 
clinics,” it is unclear whether he was employed by an amusement or 
recreational establishment.238 If the court concludes that he worked 
solely for the team’s non-amusement business operations — or 
simultaneously in both the game-day and general business 
establishments — then Section 213(a)(3) would not apply.239 
However, should the court determine that the intern was employed 
 
 233 See, e.g., Grow, supra note 217, at 610-11 (explaining that “each MLB franchise 
maintains close contractual relationships with five or six different minor league 
teams” and “assign[s] players to each of their minor league teams”).  
 234 29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (1999). 
 235 See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 236 See supra notes 196–98, 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 237 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Cooper v. LAC Basketball Club, Inc., No. 2:14-
cv-04445 (June 18, 2014) (No. 12). 
 238 Former Clippers Intern Sues Sterlings, Team, NBA.COM (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.nba.com/2014/news/06/11/clippers-intern-lawsuit.ap/. 
 239 As noted above, employees simultaneously working for both exempt and non-
exempt establishments within a single enterprise are covered by the FLSA under 29 
C.F.R. § 779.311. See supra note 84. 
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solely within the team’s game-day operations, then the team would 
likely be exempt under subsection (B)’s receipts test.240 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
As this article has shown, the case law applying Section 213(a)(3) is 
confused and contradictory, particularly in cases brought against 
professional sports teams. This article has suggested a simple new 
framework for analyzing defendants’ entitlement to the exemption. 
However, even if all courts were to apply the exemption as 
recommended here, Section 213(a)(3) would still raise questions as a 
matter of policy. This part explores the public policy implications of 
the exemption before making various proposals for reform. 
A. Public Policy Implications 
As an initial matter, Section 213(a)(3)’s seasonality provisions give 
rise to significant administrative difficulties. In industries with variable 
season lengths — a professional sports team that may or may not 
advance to post-season play, for instance — the exemption’s 
application could change from year to year.241 This is problematic for 
employers, whose budgeting for wages would have to change on an 
annual basis, sometimes dramatically. It also presents difficulties for 
workers, who would be unable to rely on a consistent annual 
income.242 And for the DOL, which is charged with enforcing the 
FLSA, monitoring and enforcement become complicated when an 
employer’s exempt status potentially changes from year to year. 
Moreover, even if courts employed a proper Section 213(a)(3) 
analysis, the results in some cases would likely be troubling from a 
public policy perspective. As Part III.C explained, the pending FLSA 
cases brought by NFL cheerleaders and minor league baseball players 
will likely fail as a result of Section 213(a)(3). Assuming that the 
exemption is the only reason for these claims’ failure — rather than a 
lack of proof establishing minimum wage or overtime violations, for 
instance — then the law would be permitting employers worth 
hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars to evade the basic 
obligation to pay the minimum wage (a mere $7.25 per hour) and time-
 
 240 See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
 241 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 242 If the exemption does not apply, and employers must pay the minimum wage, 
then they owe workers $7.25 per hour. If the exemption applies, then employers like 
the Ben-Gals cheerleading squad could revert to their current practice of paying only 
$2.85 per hour, over sixty percent less. See supra notes 1–5, and accompanying text. 
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and-a-half overtime. One can hear echoes of the 1966 Senate debate 
over whether resort hotels would be exempt from the FLSA, in which a 
senator asked, incredulously, whether “a hotel that is affluent enough to 
charge a patron $60 a day cannot pay a worker $50 a week?”243 
The exemption of professional sports teams under Section 213(a)(3) 
is also troubling given powerful groups’ historical use of FLSA 
exemptions to remove legal protections from workers who are already 
economically and politically vulnerable.244 Though workers employed 
by professional sports teams may seem to lead glamorous lives, many 
in fact work under exploitative conditions, with little power and voice. 
Apart from their low pay, some NFL cheerleaders have been subjected 
to extremely humiliating working conditions, including being 
instructed on tampon usage and having to pass a body-fat “jiggle test” 
to ensure their fitness to cheer.245 Meanwhile, Buffalo Bills’ 
cheerleaders were instructed, “Do not be overly opinionated about 
anything. Do not complain about anything[.]”246 Cheerleaders are 
encouraged not to voice complaints about wages and working 
conditions, with reminders that “[t]here are more aspiring pros than 
there are slots on the sideline, so if one cheerleader slips up, there are 
hundreds of hopefuls waiting to take her place.”247 Likewise, many 
minor league baseball players enter the industry right after high school 
or before finishing college, while many others are recent immigrants 
with limited English skills and little familiarity with the United 
States.248 In addition, neither professional cheerleaders nor minor 
 
 243 112 CONG. REC. 20,791 (Aug. 26, 1966) (statement of Sen. Pastore). 
 244 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra note 10. 
 246 Billy Haisley, Insane Handbook: Bills Cheerleaders Are Told How to Wash Their 
Vaginas, DEADSPIN (Apr. 24, 2014), http://deadspin.com/how-to-use-a-tampon-and-
other-guidelines-for-bills-che-1567047406. 
 247 Amanda Hess, Just Cheer, Baby, ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Apr. 2, 2014), http:// 
espn.go.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/10702976/just-cheer-baby-lacy-t-sues-oakland-
raiders (“The strong camaraderie among professional cheerleaders was a selling point 
for recruiting dancers, but it was also a strategy for keeping the women in line. 
Cheerleaders were periodically reminded that hundreds of bright young women 
would kill to take their slot in the sisterhood.”). 
 248 See Tony Dokoupil, Does Major League Baseball Exploit Latino Players?, 
NBCNEWS (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/does-major-league-
baseball-exploit-latino-players-n228316 (noting that more than forty percent of minor 
league players are Latino); Clint Longenecker, Senior Discount Goes to Extremes in 
2014 Draft, BASEBALL AMERICA (June 8, 2014), http://www.baseballamerica.com/ 
draft/senior-savings-bonanza-the-2014-draft-top-10-rounds/ (noting that from “2008-
2011, an average of 30 seniors were drafted in the top 10 rounds” of the MLB draft, 
less than 10 percent of draft picks). 
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league baseball players are unionized, meaning they lack a collective 
voice with which to negotiate with their employers. 
The power imbalance between these front-line workers and their 
well-financed, politically influential employers is stark. For example, 
the professional baseball lobby is particularly, and notoriously, strong: 
between MLB and the minor leagues, there are almost two hundred 
teams spread across forty-two states.249 As Congressman Emanuel 
Celler once commented, “I have never known, in my 35 years of 
experience, of as great a lobby that descended upon the House than 
the organized baseball lobby . . . They came upon Washington like 
locusts.”250 Indeed, representatives for minor league baseball have 
discussed petitioning Congress to exempt minor league baseball 
players explicitly from the FLSA.251 
Finally, the foregoing analysis has public policy repercussions 
beyond the FLSA, implicating the tax subsidies that municipalities 
frequently hand out to professional sports teams. Cities have routinely 
given generous taxpayer subsidies to the sports industry over the last 
forty years, most often in the form of new stadiums or arenas 
constructed at public expense.252 From 1970 to 1999, for instance, 
government subsidies for new professional sports facilities totaled an 
estimated $10.4 billion, with an additional $1.4 billion spent to 
refurbish existing stadiums.253 This trend has accelerated in the 2000s, 
with the NFL alone receiving nearly $2.4 billion in public stadium 
subsidies since 2001.254 Across the four major leagues, these publicly 
 
 249 See Teams by Geographic Location, MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/milb/info/ 
geographical.jsp (last visited June 6, 2015) (reporting that around 160 minor league 
teams exist in the United States); Team-by-Team Information, MLB.COM, http://mlb. 
mlb.com/team/index.jsp (last visited June 6, 2015) (listing all 30 MLB teams). 
 250 ROGER L. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 61 (1998).  
 251 See Josh Leventhal, MiLB Opposes Players, Supports MLB in Lawsuit, BASEBALL 
AMERICA (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.baseballamerica.com/minors/milb-opposes-
players-backs-mlb-lawsuit/ (“[Minor league baseball’s vice president] announced that 
beginning next year, he will petition Congress to add minor league baseball players to 
the list of 35 occupations not required to receive minimum wage or overtime pay as 
dictated in the [FLSA].”). 
 252 For instance, sixty-five percent of arenas and eighty-seven percent of stadiums 
housing teams in the four major U.S. professional sports leagues were publicly owned 
as of the 1990s. GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 24 (1995) 
(noting same).  
 253 See David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, League Structure & Stadium 
Rent-Seeking — the Role of Antitrust Revisited, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013); see also 
Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573, 
609-10 (2015) (discussing the level of public subsidization of sports stadiums). 
 254 See Haddock et al., supra note 253, at 7. 
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funded facilities have been estimated to cost their host communities as 
much as $500 million per year.255 
Cities have been willing to dole out these subsidies in order to 
obtain the perceived economic benefits that many believe sports teams 
provide to their home communities.256 The public often accepts that 
building a new stadium will not only spur construction-related job 
creation in the short-term, but also lead to economic growth in and 
around the new facility in the long-term.257 In reality, however, 
economists have almost uniformly concluded that new sports 
stadiums have no measurable, positive impact on a city’s economy,258 
as any increased spending in and around a new stadium or arena is 
usually offset by a reduction in economic activity in other areas of the 
local economy.259 
 
 255 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of 
Professional Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1701 (1996) (“[S]ubsidies for 
professional sports teams currently drain $500 million annually from state and local 
governments.”). Moreover, because many of these projects are financed using federally 
tax-exempt bonds, U.S. taxpayers effectively subsidize local communities’ stadium 
construction efforts, costing the federal treasury as much as $120 million over the 
course of thirty years for just a single $300 million stadium. See PAUL WEILER, 
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS 264 
(2000); Haddock et al., supra note 253, at 11 (discussing the use of federally tax-
exempt municipal bonds to construct sports stadiums).  
 256 See Pamela Edwards, Note, How Much Does That $8.00 Yankee Ticket Really 
Cost? An Analysis of Local Governments’ Expenditure of Public Funds to Maintain, 
Improve or Acquire an Athletic Stadium for the Use of Professional Sports Teams, 18 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 695, 695 (1991) (explaining that “[m]unicipalities seek the 
economic and cultural benefits professional sports franchises can bring”); cf. Thomas 
A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 889, 913 (1999) (“Local governments are willing to invest substantial sums to 
attract teams, as they are desperate to obtain the status of a ‘major league city.’”).  
 257 See David Mark, Comment, Taking One for the Team: The Persistent Abuse of 
Eminent Domain in Sports Stadium Construction, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 781, 801 (2010) 
(“The people footing the bill for these new stadiums, the individual taxpayers, are 
promised that the stadiums and teams coming to play in them will bring thousands of 
new jobs, an increase in tax revenues and income for their city, and an overall feeling 
of greater civic pride and image that is associated with living in the same city as a 
professional sports franchise.”). 
 258 See JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO TEAM 
SPORTS 154 (1999) (“In independent studies of the impact of stadiums, there are 
almost no instances in which stadiums were shown to lead to a measurable increase in 
the economic well-being of a city.”); Haddock et al., supra note 253, at 12-14 
(reviewing the relevant economic literature). See generally John L. Crompton, 
Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events: Eleven Sources of 
Misapplication, 9 J. SPORT MGMT. 14 (1995) (discussing misuse of economic impact 
studies to justify public subsidization of playing facilities). 
 259 See Garrett Johnson, The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities, 
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These purported economic benefits are further undercut by the fact 
that the beneficiary teams may not even be required to pay their 
employees in accordance with minimum wage and overtime laws. 
Indeed, as discussed above, professional sports franchises will often be 
exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions with 
respect to their game-day operations.260 Thus, while the public 
subsidization of the professional sports industry is generally 
objectionable as a policy matter, it is particularly unwarranted in cases 
where the beneficiary team’s game-day employees — including ticket 
takers, ushers, concessionaires, and parking attendants — may not 
even receive the FLSA’s basic guarantee of a minimum hourly wage 
and overtime pay. 
B. Reform Proposals 
In light of the foregoing analyses, this article presents two sets of 
proposals to address the problems with Section 213(a)(3). The first is 
a set of incremental changes to the exemption’s scope; the second is a 
set of sweeping reforms to all of the FLSA’s exemptions, Section 
213(a)(3) included. 
On the incremental front, the exemption might be narrowed in three 
ways that would align it more closely with its original purpose, as 
gleaned from its legislative history: the protection of economically 
precarious establishments whose operating seasons are constrained by 
external factors such as the weather, and as a result must require long 
hours from their workforce.261 
First, the minimum wage exemption could be removed from Section 
213(a)(3), leaving only the overtime exemption. Indeed, due to their 
relatively short operating seasons, some truly seasonal businesses may 
need to require their employees to work a substantial number of hours 
per week during a handful of months each year. Requiring the 
payment of time-and-a-half overtime could impose a real hardship on 
the most economically fragile of these employers, arguably justifying 
an overtime exemption in some cases. The policy rationale for these 
same employers to forgo paying the minimum wage, however, is much 
less clear. 
 
2011 DEN. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 14-15 (“Studies prove that spending money on 
sports events is usually offset by reductions in spending in other areas of 
entertainment by consumers.”). This phenomenon is known as a “substitution effect.” 
See id. at 15. 
 260 See supra Part III.B. 
 261 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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A similar proposal was considered and — unfortunately — rejected 
by Congress in 1965,262 as part of the failed set of FLSA amendments 
discussed above.263 These amendments were ultimately rejected due in 
no small part to the belief that seasonal amusement or recreational 
establishments at the time frequently employed student workers, 
employees that were thought to be able to afford to earn a lower wage 
due to their dependent status.264 This same justification in support of 
Section 213(a)(3) no longer applies today. Recent data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the median age of workers 
employed in the “arts, entertainment, and recreation” industries — the 
category that aligns most closely with the establishments covered by 
Section 213(a)(3) — was 38.1 years in 2013.265 Thus, unlike the 
student workers cited by the opponents of the 1965 FLSA 
amendments, who could arguably afford sub-minimum wages because 
their earnings were merely supplemental, today’s amusement and 
recreational workers are often adults who rely on their wages to 
support both themselves and their families.266 
A second incremental change to Section 213(a)(3) would be for 
Congress to add a revenue cap above which the exemption would not 
 
 262 H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 10 (1965) (describing a bill that “[r]epeals the 
minimum wage and overtime exemptions for such establishments [hotel, restaurant, 
motion picture, and recreational establishments; hospitals and related institutions] 
(except that seasonal resorts and seasonal recreational and amusement establishments 
maintain overtime exemptions”)).  
 263 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 264 See supra notes 67–70 (discussing legislative history regarding student workers). 
 265 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employed Persons by Detailed 
Industry and Age, 2013 Annual Averages (last modified Apr. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/industry_age.htm.  
 266 Moreover, recent economic research does not support the oft-cited proposition 
that an increase in, or expansion of, the minimum wage will necessarily result in job 
loss. See Daron Acemoglu et al., Time to Raise the Minimum Wage, ECON. POLICY INST. 
(July 23, 2012), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/raise-minimum-wage/ (“In 
recent years there have been important developments in the academic literature on the 
effect of increases in the minimum wage on employment, with the weight of evidence 
now showing that increases in the minimum wage have had little or no negative effect 
on the employment of minimum wage workers, even during times of weakness in the 
labor market.”). But see David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and 
Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research, at i (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12663), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf (“Our review indicates that there is a wide 
range of existing estimates and, accordingly, a lack of consensus about the overall 
effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage. However, the 
oft-stated assertion that recent research fails to support the traditional view that the 
minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect.”).  
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apply. Here, the amendment could mimic other capped FLSA 
exemptions such as 29 U.S.C. § 213(g), which exempts only 
agricultural employers with revenues below $10 million from the 
minimum wage requirement.267 Section 213(g) was enacted as part of 
a package of FLSA amendments in 1974,268 which expanded the FLSA 
by bringing farm workers within the statute’s coverage for the first 
time, but in such a way that affected only the very largest agricultural 
employers. Even the politically formidable farming industry — which 
has been called “the world’s most selfish lobby”269 — could seemingly 
accept the application of the FLSA to its largest, richest employers.270 
Likewise, Section 213(a)(3) could also be capped at $10 million in 
revenues, ensuring that wealthy professional sports franchises, who 
can plead no economic excuse, would be forced to pay the minimum 
wage and overtime to their front-line employees. 
A third incremental change would be to exclude teams in the four 
major U.S. professional sports leagues from Section 213(a)(3) without 
regard to their revenue. One way that such a step could be 
accomplished would be to state that no entity covered by the Sports 
 
 267 29 U.S.C. § 213(g) (2012) (“The [minimum wage] exemption . . . shall not 
apply with respect to any employee employed by an establishment (1) which controls, 
is controlled by, or is under common control with, another establishment the 
activities of which are not related for a common business purpose to, but materially 
support the activities of the establishment employing such employee; and (2) whose 
annual gross volume of sales made or business done, when combined with the annual 
gross volume of sales made or business done by each establishment which controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with, the establishment employing such 
employee, exceeds $10,000,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are 
separately stated).”). A similar cap applied to the exemptions to the minimum wage 
and overtime requirements for retail and service workers in early versions of the 
FLSA: employers with more than $1 million in revenues received no relief under the 
exemption. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 
Stat. 65 (1961) (extending FLSA coverage to retail and service employers with annual 
revenues over $1 million).  
 268 See Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural Employee Exemption from the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 649, 664 (1989) (“The most recent 
legislation affecting the agricultural exemption was the 1974 Amendment at section 
213(g) which removed from the exemption any farm unit which is part of a 
conglomerate with annual gross sales of more than $10,000,000, even if that unit 
would by itself have qualified for the exemption in terms of the man-day guidelines.”). 
 269 Steven Pearlstein, For the Farm Lobby, Too Much Is Never Enough, WASH. POST 
(June 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/25/ 
AR2009062504133.html.  
 270 S. REP. NO. 93-690, at 1506-07 (1974) (“Under the Committee bill between 90 
and 95 percent of all the Nation’s farms will remain uncovered by the Act. The only 
farms covered will continue to be the relatively large users of agricultural labor. The 
small family farm will continue to be exempt from coverage under the Act.”). 
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Broadcasting Act of 1961 (“SBA”)271 can claim exempt status under 
Section 213(a)(3). The SBA provides professional sports teams with a 
limited antitrust exemption allowing them to pool the sale of their 
league’s broadcast license rights to over-the-air networks like NBC, 
ABC, CBS, and Fox (i.e., so-called “sponsored telecasting”).272 Each of 
the four major U.S. professional sports leagues relies on the protection 
afforded by the SBA to sign lucrative national television broadcast 
agreements with the over-the-air networks.273 The NFL, for example, 
earns approximately $3 billion per year from such contracts.274 
Consequently, by conditioning the leagues’ continued antitrust 
immunity on their compliance with the FLSA, Congress could help 
ensure that teams in the four major professional sports leagues will 
pay all of their employees — game-day and non-game-day alike — in 
accordance with the minimum wage and overtime laws.275 
 
 271 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (2012). 
 272 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement 
by or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team 
sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs 
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or 
otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the 
sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey . . . .”); 
see also Grow, supra note 253, at 620 (discussing SBA). 
The SBA was originally passed after the NFL saw its initial attempts to enter a 
league-wide television broadcasting agreement with the CBS television network 
enjoined by a federal district court as an illicit restraint of trade. United States v. Nat’l 
Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (issuing injunction). See also 
Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 659 (1989) 
(recounting the history of the SBA). 
 273 See Bob Condor, NHL, NBC Sign Record-Setting 10-Year TV Deal, NHL.COM (Apr. 
19, 2011), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=560238 (reporting that the NHL 
receives $200 million per year from its television contract with NBC); Paul J. Gough, 
NBA’s $7.4 Billion TV Deals Boosted by New Media, REUTERS (June 28, 2007), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/28/us-nba-idUSN2830146220070628 (discussing the 
NBA’s current television contracts); Mark Newman, MLB Reaches Eight-Year Agreement 
with FOX, Turner, MLB.COM (Oct. 2, 2012), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/39362362 
(stating that MLB will receive a total of $12.4 billion over eight years from its most 
recent television contract). 
 274 See Mark Maske, NFL Completes TV Deal with Fox, CBS and NBC Totaling About 
$3 Billion Per Year, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
sports/redskins/nfl-completes-tv-deal-with-fox-cbs-and-nbc-totaling-about-3-billion-
per-year/2011/12/14/gIQARJdmuO_story.html (discussing the NFL’s current 
television agreements with Fox, CBS, and NBC).  
 275 The State of California has recently taken a different approach, enacting a law 
that will force California-based professional sports teams to provide their cheerleaders 
with all of the rights and benefits afforded under employment law. Assemb. B. 202, 
2015-16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (signed into law July 15, 2015). While 
this new provision is a good start, it unfortunately does not offer any protection to 
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These incremental steps would address some of the policy problems 
with Section 213(a)(3) by ensuring that seasonal amusement or 
recreation workers receive at least the minimum wage and that 
extremely profitable enterprises like professional sports franchises do 
not benefit from the exemption at all. However, even with these 
reforms, the exemption would remain in place for large numbers of 
low-revenue enterprises. Studies have shown that relatively smaller 
employers tend to be more likely to violate workers’ employment 
rights than their larger counterparts276; even a capped Section 
213(a)(3) would thus remove a basic set of economic protections from 
workers who need them the most.277 Moreover, as FLSA historian 
Marc Linder has argued, there is little economic justification for 
exempting small businesses from the FLSA’s requirements, for: 
[e]ven if the boosterist claim that small firms are a job growth 
machine were valid, the mere creation of jobs in firms that on 
average offer lower wages, fewer and inferior nonwage 
financial benefits, worse working conditions, fewer 
opportunities for acquiring greater skills, and less job security 
 
other employees of professional sports teams that may also receive sub-minimum 
wages and/or be denied overtime benefits. 
Another possible approach would be for municipalities to extract a contractual 
promise from sports teams to pay at least the minimum wage and overtime, and 
perhaps even a living wage indexed to the area cost of living, not only to construction 
workers engaged to build a taxpayer-funded stadium, but also to the team’s game-day 
employees such as ticket takers, ushers, concessionaires, and parking attendants. 
 276 ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS 
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 39 (2009), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 (finding 
in study of approximately 4,300 low-wage, front-line workers that “workers employed 
by companies with less than 100 employees were at greater risk of experiencing 
violations [of their labor and employment rights] than those employed by larger 
companies”); DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC 
ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 75 (2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf (noting that “smaller 
employers . . . often face more competitive conditions in their local markets,” leading 
to “violations of labor standards” for low-wage workers); see also Taken for a Ride, 
supra note 18 (detailing FLSA violations and other employment rights abuses 
experienced by immigrant fair and carnival workers). 
 277 See, e.g., Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act: The “Original” Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial 
Policy, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 403, 494 (1998) (“Promoting small construction businesses by 
exempting them from labor standards laws not only deprives workers of the 
protections of those mandates, but also subjects them to other substandard conditions 
that are, to be sure, not unlawful, but are manifestly consequences of this sector’s 
small and stagnant character.”). 
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is no reason to require their employees to subsidize them to 
the detriment of larger firms.278 
A more sweeping set of FLSA reforms, then, would eliminate all 
exemptions, or at least revisit the statute’s haphazard suite of 
exemptions in an attempt to create some uniformity and policy 
rationale for carving out certain industries or occupations. An 
overhaul of the FLSA’s exemptions would, at minimum, root out 
exemptions that were motivated by racism (e.g. the farm and domestic 
worker exemptions);279 reexamine exemptions that benefit single, 
narrow interest groups (e.g. the exemptions for shellfish workers and 
wreath makers);280 and fix those exemptions that are unworkable from 
an administrability perspective (e.g., the “white collar” exemptions, 
which draw unclear lines between those managerial and professional 
employees who are exempt from, and those who are eligible for, 
overtime).281 If any exemptions are to remain in the statute, barring a 
persuasive policy rationale to the contrary, they should relieve 
employers only of the FLSA’s overtime requirement and leave in place 
the minimum wage guarantee, which, at a mere $7.25 per hour, is 
already lower than the living wage for many U.S. families.282 Further, 
as part of its overhaul of the FLSA, Congress should consider capping 
any exemptions that remain in the statute based on the employer’s 
revenue in the manner discussed above, to ensure that the country’s 
wealthiest employers are not profiting on the backs of workers who 
are paid sub-minimum wages. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined Section 213(a)(3), an often overlooked 
FLSA provision that exempts seasonal amusement or recreational 
establishments from the statute’s minimum wage and overtime 
requirements. The article has reviewed the existing case law — much 
of it conflicting — that has applied the exemption, and proposed a 
new, simplified framework for determining its applicability. The 
article then applied this new framework to a series of recent FLSA 
lawsuits brought against professional sports teams, employers that 
 
 278 Id. at 493-94. 
 279 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 280 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 281 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 282 Amy K. Glasmeier, Update on 3/24/2014, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR, MIT (Mar. 
24, 2014), http://livingwage.mit.edu/articles/1-update-on-3-24-2014 (“The minimum 
wage does not provide a living wage for most American families.”). 
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may in some cases qualify for the Section 213(a)(3) exemption. 
Having determined that sports teams are, in many circumstances, 
exempt from the FLSA, the article concluded by considering the policy 
implications of the exemption and proposing various reforms to 
ensure that the FLSA can deliver on its promise of providing all 
workers “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”283 
 
 283 Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). 
